The announced reform to shorten military service is in fact a challenge rather than a well-thought-out reform. This view is held by military expert David Jamalyan.
Pre-Election Ploy and Fulfillment of Aliyev’s Demands
According to him, the reform was initially planned for implementation starting June 2026; apparently, the General Staff sought at least to buy time to adapt the system to these changes. Nevertheless, Jamalyan continues, in a system led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, everything can change in an instant—and that is precisely what happened a few days ago.
“I am certain that for the General Staff and the Ministry, the directive that the reform must take effect from January 1 came as an unpleasant surprise,” he notes.
The expert explains that this haste is driven by the desire to secure votes in the 2026 elections, as he believes the authorities have no chance of reelection—not even through falsifications to ensure their reproduction. Recent events have demonstrated that the current administration lacks public support. The security risks associated with this reform are evident, yet the authorities ignore these dangers.
“I would not pay attention to the justifications from the Defense Minister or his deputies—they are false and aimed at creating the illusion that quantitative shortages can be compensated by quality, but it is merely an illusion,” the expert adds.
In his view, there is currently no rational justification for rushing the reform’s implementation, aside from an attempt to “squeeze out” votes in the elections—and, in a broader sense, to fulfill Aliyev’s demands for Armenia’s demilitarization.
What State-Oriented Forces Should Do
Jamalyan advises and strongly urges state-oriented forces not to categorically oppose the reform’s implementation:
“Let our boys indeed serve 18 months, but with one condition—the inevitable shortfall in troop numbers that will arise in the army as a result of the reform must be compensated by deploying Internal Ministry subordinate units on combat duty. Internal troops or police guard—it makes no difference: let them remove their berets, don helmets, and go on combat duty. Patrolling services can also be included in this process,” Jamalyan states.
The expert insists that this is not a new idea:
“In 2018, such a practice already existed—in the midst of widespread euphoria, Nikol Pashinyan announced that internal troops should be involved in combat duty. Incidentally, this was one of the rare steps that society perceived positively. So be it.”