When Srbuhi Galyan assumed the role of Minister of Justice, she declared that accelerating the process of constitutional reforms was one of her priorities. However, the first meeting of the Constitutional Reform Council took place only eight months later. Judging by the current pace, the Ministry of Justice seems to have adopted a “hurry slowly” approach, raising the question: will constitutional reforms become a reality before the elections? Council members Edmon Marukyan and Daniel Ioannisyan consider this unlikely, ruling out the possibility of preparing a draft before the elections. Nevertheless, the minister herself remains more optimistic, believing that a draft of the new Constitution can be ready on time and deems it entirely achievable.
The “Laboratory” Method and a Limited Role
“Armenia is not rushing to adopt a new Constitution and aims to ensure its development through maximally thorough internal discussions. The draft being prepared will generally align with the previously approved concept of the new Constitution, though this does not rule out consideration of other possible provisions. We have chosen the following working method: the ministry prepares the text, then presents it to the Constitutional Reform Council, inviting its members to discuss the proposed provisions and vote. The first discussion has already taken place, and it appears that from September, meetings will become more frequent, as there will be sufficient material by then. I am convinced that having the text of the new Constitution ready before the elections is a realistic goal,” Galyan stated.
In essence, the ministry has opted for a “laboratory” method—first drafting the text internally and then submitting it for discussion. At first glance, this might seem positive, but it is only superficially so. This approach effectively limits the council’s real involvement in the document’s development. The core work on the text occurs within the ministry, while the Constitutional Reform Council essentially serves as a consultative and evaluative body rather than a full-fledged participant in the drafting process. This de facto means that the council members’ initiative and substantive proposals take a backseat: they do not shape the document but receive a ready-made version for discussion and voting. Such an approach restricts the horizontality of the process and may indicate insufficient inclusivity in the reforms. The question of the process’s transparency also remains open. Since Galyan’s appointment, the practice of holding council discussions live on air has been discontinued, and deliberations now take place behind closed doors.
The Declaration of Independence
The issue of transparency is particularly critical, as it concerns a matter of great public interest: will the new Constitution include a reference to the Declaration of Independence? This issue was not discussed at the council’s last meeting. However, Edmon Marukyan promised that when this topic is addressed, he will insist on holding discussions live on air. To date, three council members—Edmon Marukyan, Daniel Ioannisyan, and Artur Sakunts—have publicly stated their opposition to removing the reference to the Declaration from the Constitution’s preamble. Other council members have so far refrained from publicly expressing their positions.
According to the minister, various approaches are being discussed, and no final decision has been made on this matter. However, Galyan herself is confident that “no legal act should jeopardize peace, security, or territorial integrity in the region.” This essentially suggests that, at least at the ministerial level, there is an inclination to exclude the reference to the Declaration out of concern that its inclusion could prevent Azerbaijan from signing a peace treaty. Nevertheless, on an official level, the minister, citing a Constitutional Court ruling, assured that mentioning the Declaration in the Constitution’s preamble cannot serve as an obstacle to signing a peace treaty.
Balance of Power and the Risk of Political Chaos
To date, the Constitutional Reform Council has discussed critical issues such as the need for a stable parliamentary majority, the role of the National Assembly in forming the government—specifically, the possibility of expressing positions on candidates for deputy prime ministers and ministers—and the ability to initiate votes of no confidence against individual government members. Although these topics have been discussed, no voting has taken place, so they cannot yet be considered enshrined provisions of the future Constitution.
Minister of Justice Srbuhi Galyan emphasizes that any reforms must, above all, reduce the risk of political chaos. According to her, global practices include cases of minority governments being formed when a stable majority cannot be secured in parliament, which can lead to destabilization. By abandoning the idea of a stable majority, the country must embed mechanisms in the Constitution to ensure a functional parliament capable of forming a government and making effective decisions.