Discussions surrounding constitutional changes in Armenia are moving in the wrong direction. Most political forces attempt to present the issue as a flaw in the system of governance, arguing that a semi-presidential model could resolve the country’s governance crisis. In reality, the problem lies not in the constitutional structure, but in the people who are willing to violate the Constitution for personal or political interests. This view is shared by constitutional law expert Vardan Poghosyan.
According to him, there is no such thing as a perfect constitution; there are good and bad constitutions. A good constitution is one in which the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances function at the level of effective mechanisms. A bad constitution is one in which, legally, everything is concentrated in the hands of a single individual.
1995: the super-presidential system
In Poghosyan’s assessment, the recent resurgence of “nostalgia” for the 1995 Constitution is particularly dangerous. He notes that the document adopted at that time was formally presented as semi-presidential, but in reality established a super-presidential system.
The president of the republic was considered the guarantor of the functioning of all three branches of power and possessed direct levers of influence over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The president could, with almost no restrictions, dissolve the National Assembly, appoint and dismiss the government, and exercise control over the judicial system.
A closed circle was created within the judiciary: the president chaired the council of justice, which in turn proposed judicial candidates to the very same president. The same person proposed and approved the appointments.
Under these conditions, the existence of an independent judiciary was practically impossible. Courageous judges became exceptions rather than the product of the system.
The constitutional amendments of 2005 somewhat reduced the president’s powers, but the dependence of the judiciary remained.
The illusion of the judicial appointment mechanism
The current Constitution requires a three-fifths majority for the appointment of judges. “The current Constitution clearly states that a three-fifths majority is required for the appointment of judges. In the case of the Court of Cassation, the choice is made by the National Assembly, while other judges are appointed by the president based on a three-fifths nomination,” he said.
The goal of this mechanism is obvious — to ensure a certain level of consensus among political forces. However, today such consensus does not exist, as the ruling force effectively holds a majority large enough to bypass the very idea of political balance. In this sense, Poghosyan acknowledges that a problem exists.
At the same time, the proposed alternative, whereby more than half of parliamentary factions must agree, is even worse. “In this case, we may reach a situation where we will have no judges at all,” he noted, adding that while three-fifths may not be the ideal solution, it nevertheless creates a reasonable balance.
The illusion of a constitution that excludes one-man rule
Poghosyan also challenges the thesis that a constitution should exclude one-man rule. According to him, such constitutions did not exist in the past, do not exist today, and will never exist, because a constitution is implemented through people.
If a constitution establishes balanced mechanisms (at least at the level of 2005 or 2015), everything else depends on those who exercise power.
At the same time, democracy operates on the rule of the majority. If a political force wins a majority in elections and that majority unquestioningly follows its leader, then regardless of the system — presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary — checks and balances will not function.
The dangerous idealization of the semi-presidential system
In this context, Poghosyan emphasizes the dangers of the semi-presidential system. According to him, this system fails to answer the main question: who exactly determines the country’s policy as the executive power.
On one hand, there is a president directly elected by the people — an institution with direct legitimacy. On the other hand, there is a parliament also directly elected by the people. However, there are no guarantees that the political will of these two legitimately elected bodies will coincide.
As a result, a situation may arise where the parliamentary majority has one political direction, while the president of the republic has a completely different one. This contradiction is structural in a semi-presidential system.
Poghosyan recalls that different countries have tried to solve this problem in various ways, but no country has ever managed to regulate it definitively.
France is considered the “homeland” of the semi-presidential system, yet even there, conflicts between the president and the prime minister have become systemic. When majorities did not coincide, open political wars broke out between the president and the government. There have even been situations where the country could not agree on who should represent the state at international summits — the president or the prime minister.
These contradictions forced the French to change the electoral calendar — bringing presidential and parliamentary elections closer in time so that majorities would coincide. But this is precisely where, according to Poghosyan, the next problem arises: when majorities do coincide, the president effectively gains full executive power — through a compliant prime minister and parliament.
In other words, the system operates in two extremes: either anarchic governance or absolute centralization.