Azerbaijan seeks to maintain as many alternative transport routes as possible, while the TRIPP project has become one of the instruments through which Baku connects various negotiating processes with Armenia. This view was expressed by political analyst Robert Ghevondyan.
Azerbaijan Wants as Many Alternatives as Possible
According to Ghevondyan, Azerbaijan considers alternative communications strategically important. Although Georgia remains the principal transit route, a corridor through Armenia is also highly valuable for Baku.
The analyst says that during meetings and discussions with Azerbaijani counterparts, TRIPP frequently appears as the underlying context for many other processes involving Armenia.
In his assessment, Baku’s logic is the following: if TRIPP is implemented, progress can also be made on border delimitation, the reopening of communications and commercial relations. If the project is delayed or pushed into the background, Azerbaijan may lose interest in advancing the other tracks.
Ghevondyan stresses that this is not a direct quotation from Azerbaijani officials but a general description of the political approach visible across different negotiating platforms.
The Discussion Goes Beyond TRIPP
According to the analyst, a new communication route through northern Armenia is also being discussed.
The proposal concerns railway and road infrastructure through Tavush, Lori and Shirak toward Turkey, potentially creating a genuine alternative to the route through Georgia.
Ghevondyan says representatives of his organization personally inspected the entire area designated for TRIPP’s railway section one or two months ago.
Most people examine the terrain from the road above, but his group travelled directly along the bank of the Araks River, where the railway is expected to be built.
The inspection, he says, showed that on the most difficult sections of the TRIPP route, only a railway line can realistically be constructed.
Building a road there as well would require extensive engineering work, including cutting through mountains and reshaping the terrain, which could also create problems for the Araks riverbed. In that respect, the route’s capacity is significantly limited.
Northern Armenia offers much more space. Several railway and road links could be constructed there simultaneously, together with tunnels where necessary. These are technically manageable projects, while building tunnels directly along the Araks would be considerably more difficult and risky.
Aliyev Wants Armenia to Remain a Backup Option
Political analyst Ruben Mehrabyan, in turn, argues that Azerbaijan is shaping its policy so that routes through Armenia never become the primary direction.
According to him, Ilham Aliyev wants to preserve several options as a “Plan B,” “Plan C” or even “Plan D,” while preventing any of them from becoming the main international transit route.
“Azerbaijan wants the principal cargo flows to continue passing through its territory. Armenia may have other roads, but not routes that become the region’s primary communications corridor,” Mehrabyan says.
He believes Turkey shares the same position. Both countries are interested in ensuring that Armenia receives as little economic benefit as possible from future infrastructure projects.
Turkey Also Does Not Want Armenia to Become the Main Route
According to Mehrabyan, Turkey is seeking to extract maximum political and economic benefit from the current situation.
He notes that Ankara has received substantial credit support from international financial institutions by presenting itself as an alternative communications route.
The Turkish argument, according to the analyst, is that if the railway operating in Armenia remains under Russian management, alternative routes through Turkey should be financed instead.
Ghevondyan says this process has not yet been fully completed. However, if Armenia continues to delay, those projects will become operational and regional cargo flows will be permanently redirected.
“If we delay for too long, they will achieve their objective,” he says.
The Russian Railway Concession Must Be Addressed First
For this reason, Ghevondyan argues that one of the first priorities after a new Armenian government is formed should be resolving the Russian railway concession issue.
As long as the railway continues operating under its current arrangement, most international infrastructure projects will continue bypassing Armenia.
TRIPP is an exception, he says, because that project has almost no viable alternative.
For all other directions, alternatives exist. If Armenia cannot quickly resolve the issues of management and infrastructure, international actors will simply choose other routes.
Armenia Can Still Change the Situation
Despite the concerns, Ghevondyan believes Armenia still has an opportunity to reverse the current trend.
If the concession issue is settled quickly, the next step should be the accelerated development of domestic transport infrastructure.
He cites the Vanadzor–Fioletovo railway section, which has been discussed since 2008.
The analyst is convinced that the project will never be built under the current concession model.
“I am convinced that neither South Caucasus Railway nor any other Russian organization will construct that section because it strengthens Armenia’s sovereignty, and that does not serve their interests,” he says.
A Northern Railway Could Transform Regional Logistics
If Armenia builds a northern railway through Tavush, Lori and Shirak, Ghevondyan argues that the market will select it naturally.
The economy, he says, always follows three principles: a route must be shorter, faster and cheaper.
Those factors could persuade international freight operators to abandon alternative corridors and choose the northern Armenian route.
According to him, the route would be roughly 100 kilometers shorter than the TRIPP option and approximately the same distance shorter than the existing railway through Georgia.
Its advantage is not limited to distance.
The northern route would also have significantly greater capacity.
Because of Georgia’s mountainous terrain, a locomotive can pull only a limited number of wagons. In the flatter northern parts of Armenia, much longer trains could be assembled, improving transport efficiency and reducing costs.
“The economy is stronger than politics. If a route is shorter, faster, cheaper and has greater capacity, cargo flows will eventually move there on their own,” Ghevondyan says.
Security: Why the Northern Route Is More Stable
The analyst argues that regional communications are usually discussed primarily through economic calculations, but security is equally important.
This is where the route through northern Armenia gains an additional advantage.
Ghevondyan recalls that TRIPP is expected to run directly along Iran’s border and will be built by an American company.
“We must take into account the current state of relations between the United States and Iran. Today there may be attempts to resolve those issues, but no one can guarantee that a new security crisis will not emerge several years from now. If such a situation develops, it will immediately affect the operation of that road,” he says.
Even if Washington and Tehran are currently pursuing dialogue, investors always consider long-term risks.
The Route Through Georgia Also Carries Security Risks
Ghevondyan also draws attention to the existing communications through Georgia.
The railway passes only several kilometers from the occupied territory of South Ossetia, while some sections of the road are just a few dozen meters from the dividing line.
“That is also a serious security risk. It is often ignored, but it exists,” he says.
In this context, the route through northern Armenia is in a more favorable position.
It is located at roughly equal distance from both the Iranian and Russian borders, which, in his assessment, substantially reduces the probability of direct military incidents or provocations.
The Risk of “Accidental” Incidents Is Lower
Ghevondyan emphasizes that this does not mean any country is technically incapable of striking northern Armenia. Such a capability clearly exists.
The difference is that along infrastructure crossing northern Armenia, it would be practically impossible to organize a small border incident and present it as an accident.
“With TRIPP or the Georgian route, someone could theoretically claim that a shot was directed elsewhere or that an unauthorized action occurred. Along a road through northern Armenia, such explanations would not work. Long-range weapons would have to be used, which would represent an entirely different level of action and political responsibility,” he says.
For this reason, the northern route would be more predictable for international investors from a security perspective.
The Economy Will Select the Most Efficient Route
In Robert Ghevondyan’s view, the final long-term decision will be made not by politicians but by economic logic.
If one route is shorter, faster, cheaper, has greater capacity and provides higher security, freight operators will eventually choose it.
That rule applies globally and does not depend on the political preferences of individual states.
“Aliyev may want one thing and Erdoğan another, but if the northern route through Armenia is economically advantageous, cargo flows will move there over time,” the analyst says.
Europe Is Discussing More Than TRIPP
According to Ghevondyan, European officials have repeatedly expressed readiness in recent months to invest in Armenia’s infrastructure.
However, when the discussion is reduced exclusively to the TRIPP project, European representatives often emphasize that their vision is much broader.
“When you say TRIPP, they respond: no, this is not only about TRIPP. They do not specify exactly which projects they mean, but it is obvious that the discussions are much broader,” he says.
The analyst believes this shows that international partners view Armenia as a potential broader infrastructure hub rather than merely as the location of a single project.
Armenia Could Become One of the Region’s Most Attractive Transit Routes
Summarizing his assessment, Ghevondyan notes that Azerbaijan currently remains the principal East-West communications hub because there is no complete alternative route.
However, if the necessary conditions are created, Armenia could become the next most attractive direction.
“Today Iran lies to the south and Russia to the north, which places Azerbaijan in the most advantageous position. But after Azerbaijan, the most desirable route for China, the European Union, the United States and other actors in the global economy could pass through Armenia,” he says.
This is where political contradictions emerge, he adds, because the preferences of Azerbaijan and Turkey do not correspond to the economic logic guiding international markets and major investors.
In his view, if Armenia quickly resolves its infrastructure problems, railway management and the development of its internal road network, the country’s geographical position could become a competitive advantage rather than a liability, transforming the entire regional communications map.