If a serious alternative opposition center is not formed before the elections, the ruling force will have nothing to worry about. This was stated by political analyst Suren Surenyants, who added that the government currently holds tactical advantages.
According to him, Armenia’s political landscape is currently witnessing a significant process of negotiations among various forces. There are 2–3 meetings per week, but no results have been achieved so far. He is confident that political forces still have time to clarify issues of cooperation and the formation of pre-election alliances. Surenyants predicts that concrete agreements could emerge by October–November. He added that, most likely, 4 to 5 pre-election blocs will be formed. “The force that can present a competent alternative program and pursue the right tactics will be able to make Nikol Pashinyan’s life hell. However, if the political landscape reverts to the rules of the game from 2021, then Nikol Pashinyan will turn our lives and the life of the entire country into hell,” he stated.
The political analyst emphasized the importance of making realistic pre-election promises. “It’s necessary to understand that no matter who comes to power in Armenia, they will not be able to reverse two things—the 2018 revolution and the surrender of Artsakh. I know many will prefer to make rosy foreign policy promises, but the agenda of returning Artsakh is a deceitful one. There’s no need to play with the emotions of thousands of Artsakh Armenians. They have already lost their homeland—why are we trying to make them believe in something we can never deliver?” he stressed.
In turn, political analyst Armen Manvelyan notes that the protest electorate in Armenia is currently significant — according to his estimates, about 60–65% of the population expresses dissatisfaction with the government’s actions. However, he emphasizes that this group is highly diverse, uniting people with different political views, economic interests, and social expectations. As a result, Manvelyan believes that no single political force can unite the entire protest electorate and lead it. To effectively influence the political situation, several active forces capable of representing different segments of the protest electorate and working in coordination with each other are needed.