“Azerbaijan is walking through a narrowing tunnel, and it seems there is no way to break away and take a different path,” says political scientist and orientalist Karine Gevorgyan, describing Azerbaijan’s current geopolitical trajectory. According to her, Baku is not only distancing itself from its traditional partner, Moscow, but also, less obviously, from Ankara, increasingly falling under the influence of what she calls “ultraglobalists.”
Tel Aviv Meeting: A New Caspian Status Without Russia or Turkey
Gevorgyan references a document she received, revealing plans for a closed event in Tel Aviv on June 25, dedicated to changing the international status of the Caspian Sea. “I was sent a very interesting photo of a document. An invitation to an exclusive event in Tel Aviv. Very high-level attendance, a very closed event, dedicated to changing the international status of the Caspian. It was supposed to involve representatives from three countries: Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United States,” she says.
According to her, the meeting discussed a new international status for the Caspian, excluding Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and, notably, Turkey. Gevorgyan considers the absence of the Turkish flag a significant signal. She emphasizes that Azerbaijan, under Ilham Aliyev’s leadership, is demonstrating a drift not only from Moscow but also from Ankara, causing discontent for Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “I have the impression that Ilham Aliyev’s older brother, meaning Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a man who knows how to find room for maneuver where others don’t, is not entirely pleased,” Gevorgyan notes.
This drift, in her view, is tied to the growing influence of “ultraglobalists” operating with the support of British intelligence. Gevorgyan asserts that these forces manipulate not only Azerbaijan’s leadership but also its local elites, subordinating them to their interests. “Baku is entirely under the control of ultraglobalists, served by British intelligence,” she stresses, pointing to the long-standing presence of British companies in Azerbaijan since 1994, which, in her opinion, makes Baku a “partner or even a client of ultraglobalist London.”
Ankara’s Discontent: Turks Sidelined
Gevorgyan highlights that Turkey, traditionally considered Azerbaijan’s key ally, is losing its influence. She points to a specific example: “The training and instruction of Azerbaijani military personnel are now mainly handled by Russian-speaking Israelis. The Turks have been sidelined. I understand that Erdoğan doesn’t like this.” This displacement of Turkish instructors by Israeli specialists, in her view, is one of the factors causing tension in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations.
Moreover, she suggests that Erdoğan is wary of being drawn into a potential conflict with Iran, to which, she believes, Azerbaijan is being pushed by external forces. “If hostilities break out, and Aliyev is now setting everything up for this, moving equipment to the borders with Iran, will Erdoğan have to intervene? He’s being dragged into this story. But he doesn’t want to fight Iran, because they have 140,000 [troops] there, while he has only 40. His mobilization resources for this theater of military operations are insufficient,” Gevorgyan says. She emphasizes that Turkey is not prepared for a military confrontation with Iran, making Erdoğan’s position vulnerable, especially if Azerbaijan continues to follow a course set by external actors. However, at this stage, Gevorgyan doubts that Aliyev would send Azerbaijani soldiers to die in a war against Iran.
Zangezur Corridor: American PMCs Under the Guise of Logistics
Turning to the Zangezur Corridor, Gevorgyan notes that attempts to change the Caspian’s status are being pursued through the corridor and an American logistics company, which Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has agreed to. In her view, the American logistics company tasked with managing transport links between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Gevorgyan suggests it will likely be a private military company (PMC), as such entities typically secure international communication routes of this kind.
She links American involvement in this project to broader geopolitical ambitions. “From my perspective, Trump is comfortable with the role of American PMCs in Asia. He doesn’t lose face; he remains the decorative leader,” Gevorgyan notes. She allows that Donald Trump may have reached some agreement with the “ultraglobalists,” though she stresses she is not an expert on American politics and cannot definitively judge his motives. Nevertheless, she sees this project as a way for the U.S. to strengthen its presence in the region, bypassing the interests of both Russia and Turkey.
Azerbaijan in the Trap of External Forces
Ultimately, according to Gevorgyan, Azerbaijan’s actions are not always voluntary. “For some reason, it’s forced, not even intentional. He has no other choice. He’s walking through a narrowing tunnel,” she says of Ilham Aliyev. She notes that a rift with Moscow was disadvantageous for Baku, as Russia previously turned a blind eye to many of Azerbaijan’s actions, ensuring economic benefits. However, in her view, Aliyev was compelled to take these steps, likely under pressure from external forces.
Gevorgyan emphasizes that Azerbaijan, by drifting away from its traditional allies—Moscow and Ankara—risks becoming a pawn in a larger geopolitical game where its interests are subordinated to those of external forces. This creates not only domestic but also regional risks, particularly in the context of strained relations with Iran and the potential for conflict.