There is essentially no need to adopt a new Constitution. This was stated by former judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia Alvina Gyulumyan. According to her, the fundamental law of the state should not become a document dependent on changes in political elites.
Not every government should attempt to change the Constitution
Gyulumyan notes that she herself is a supporter of a stable Constitution and considers unacceptable the situation in which every political force, upon coming to power, tries to amend or adopt a new Constitution.
As an example of a stable Constitution, she cites the United States, emphasizing that the country’s Basic Law has been in effect for nearly two centuries. During that time, in her assessment, only a limited number of amendments have been made, but the fundamental document has not undergone radical transformation.
“And we keep changing it constantly, as if we are in a perpetual experimental field,” she stresses.
The significance of the Constitution’s preamble
In Gyulumyan’s conviction, if the goal is to get rid of the preamble of the Constitution — especially when it comes to the preamble of the first Constitution adopted after the declaration of independence — it will nonetheless continue to have landmark significance for the state, defining the values and principles by which the state should be guided.
She emphasizes that in constitutional justice and international practice, even the preambles of already non-operational constitutions have been regarded as a basis for interpreting subsequent constitutions and laws. Therefore, even if a new Constitution is adopted and the preamble is changed or removed, it is impossible to completely “abandon” it.
What changes could be discussed
At the same time, the former judge does not rule out that there could be other significant changes. However, in her view, if the adoption of a new Constitution is initiated, the public should be presented with a clear concept — what exactly will change and why.
According to her, by familiarizing oneself with the approaches of the ruling political force, one can roughly imagine what changes might be proposed. Gyulumyan assumes that issues such as provisions concerning the exclusive role of the church or the process of appointing judges — particularly the question of parliamentary involvement — could become subjects of discussion. She stresses that it is also important to understand how these changes will be received by society and whether opposition “no” camps will form.
Past experience and the issue of public trust
Gyulumyan also refers to previous constitutional amendments. In her assessment, the 2005 amendments were to some extent acceptable. According to her, during the 2005 amendments, the authorities in power at that time apparently did not pursue the goal of self-reproduction through those changes — at least, no pronounced suspicions of that kind were formed in society.
But during the 2015 constitutional amendments, when the system of government was changed, there was already suspicion in society that the president might aim to continue holding power — this time as prime minister. According to Gyulumyan’s assessment, subsequent developments showed that those concerns were not entirely unfounded. “This also became, to some extent, a cause of generating public discontent,” she noted.
Overall, Gyulumyan is convinced that the Constitution should contribute to the formation of public solidarity and consensus. “If the changes do not bring public solidarity, then probably their necessity is questionable,” she concludes.