The United States in some respects underestimated Iran; essentially, the scenario of “rapid regime change” did not work. This is noted by political scientist Tigran Grigoryan. According to him, the calculations behind the U.S. military-political pressure on Iran were apparently based on previous experience of military operations in the Middle East, but in Iran’s case the situation is substantially different.
Why the Rapid Regime Change Scenario Failed
According to the political scientist, Iran is fundamentally different from the countries where previous attempts were made to change power through external intervention. If in Iraq, Libya, or Afghanistan they dealt mainly with personalized regimes where the entire system depended on one leader, in Iran a much more institutionalized system of governance has been formed.
In his assessment, the Iranian system may have numerous problems — it may be inefficient or corrupt — but it is based on a series of institutions and centers of influence. “In Iran, there are numerous state and semi-state institutions, parallel structures, and influence groups operating. For example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a structure with enormous influence. Under such conditions, neutralizing one or several leaders cannot lead to the complete collapse of the entire system,” he notes. That is why, in Iran’s case, even the elimination of high-level political or spiritual leaders has not led to the collapse of the state governance system.
In the political scientist’s opinion, if the calculation was that it would be possible to quickly achieve a change of power or the advancement of more moderate forces within the power structure, then at the current stage it can be stated that this scenario has not materialized.
Rapid Military Victory, but Not Stability
Analyzing U.S. military operations in the Middle East over the past decades, Grigoryan notes that there is one main conclusion around which there is virtually broad agreement. The U.S. can achieve military successes fairly quickly, but it is precisely after those successes that the problems begin.
For example, active military operations in Iraq ended in about one month. Similar speed was seen in Afghanistan, and in the case of Libya there was not even a need for large-scale deployment of American troops — the issue was mainly resolved through air strikes.
However, according to the political scientist, the main question is what happens after the military victory.
Expensive Experience That Did Not Bring Success
Grigoryan emphasizes that the U.S.’s previous experience in this area has been quite negative. After military operations in Iraq, a power vacuum emerged in the region, which was exploited by the most radical groups. In particular, that very situation was one of the factors that contributed to the formation of the terrorist organization “Islamic State.”
In Libya, a stable political system has still not been achieved to this day, and in Afghanistan, after many years of military presence, the U.S. ultimately withdrew completely from the country, failing to achieve the formation of stable state governance.
According to the political scientist, this experience shows that even enormous financial resources do not guarantee success. “In Iraq and Afghanistan, not billions but trillions were spent, yet even in that case effective state-building could not be achieved,” he notes.
What Is the Real Goal
According to him, the current U.S. administration declares that it is not pursuing the goal of state-building. The expert also recalls that Donald Trump actively criticized the policy of engaging in state-building after wars in various countries even during his election campaign.
In Grigoryan’s view, the main goal of the current policy may be not direct regime change, but the maximum possible weakening of Iran’s capabilities. In this way, an attempt is being made to reduce the threats that Iran may pose to the interests of Israel and the U.S. in the region.
However, even this approach, according to the political scientist, has its limitations. If the current authorities remain in power, Iran may be able to quite quickly restore its lost capabilities — both in the missile program and in the field of nuclear enrichment.
In addition, some experts point to one more important circumstance. If previously no final political decision had been made in Iran to create nuclear weapons, external military pressure could strengthen the influence of forces with a tougher stance and push them to take steps in that direction.
Thus, according to Grigoryan’s assessment, the processes developing around Iran show that the experience of forceful interventions in the Middle East continues to have complex and often unpredictable consequences. At the same time, Iran’s institutional structure makes the scenario of “rapid regime change” significantly more difficult to implement than in other countries previously.