The documents published by the Armenian government represent only part of the large archive connected to the Artsakh peace process. Former SRC chairman Davit Ananyan notes that these papers do not show the full picture. The conflict lasted almost thirty years. During this period, hundreds of meetings took place under the OSCE Minsk Group. Dozens of documents were drafted, many marked as “top secret.” The package published yesterday is only a fragment.
Despite this, Ananyan says the documents allow us to draw several important and sometimes decisive conclusions. They help explain what happened and why many opportunities were lost.
The 2019 Package: An Updated Version of Earlier Proposals
According to Ananyan, the 2019 package is an updated version of the 2016 and 2018 proposals. The logic is the same in all cases. Armenia was expected to make strict and irreversible concessions. Artsakh’s final status remained unclear.
The plan required Armenia to return five districts to Azerbaijan as a first step. Armenian forces and civilians had to withdraw. Azerbaijan would establish administrative control. International peacekeepers would be deployed on the former NKAO line. Artsakh would receive only an interim status.
The final status would be decided through a referendum. However, the document did not define any guaranteed outcome or legal commitment.
This structure repeated the logic of the Madrid, Kazan, 2016 and Krakow documents. Armenia received obligations. Artsakh received no secure future.
Accepting the package would mean agreeing to irreversible territorial concessions and to a peacekeeping mandate. It also meant accepting that the status of Artsakh would be decided by a vague and risky process.
Why Rejection Was Dangerous
Ananyan agrees that the document was dangerous. But he says the idea that “Pashinyan caused the war only by refusing to sign” is too simple. The geopolitical reality showed something else. Azerbaijan’s behavior made it clear that rejection would lead to serious consequences.
This is where the key contradiction appears. Many people now see this not just as a mistake but as inaction that harmed national security.
If Pashinyan decided not to sign, he had to prepare the country for the cost of refusal. If war was becoming likely, the government needed to rebuild the army, strengthen alliances, change the security system, inform the public and apply deterrence.
According to Ananyan, none of this was done.
The Illusion of a “Peace Era”
Instead, Pashinyan promoted the idea of a “new era of peace.” This created a false sense of safety. It hid the real scale of the threat. Ananyan argues that this was not only short-sighted but opened the path to disaster.
There was also a dangerous double message. Pashinyan said, “Artsakh is Armenia, period.” But at the same time, he continued negotiating based on documents where this idea did not exist at all.
This double message confused the public. It also allowed Azerbaijan to present Armenia as an “uncompromising and unpredictable” side. Armenia became diplomatically weak. Azerbaijan appeared to be the “patient side” waiting for peace.
A Failure to Prepare the State
According to Ananyan, Pashinyan neither signed the 2019 package nor prepared the country for the consequences of rejecting it. He did not rebuild the army. He did not restore alliances. He did not inform the public honestly.
In the end, he “gambled with time, lives and the statehood of Armenia.”
Ananyan concludes that this behavior should be viewed not just as a political mistake. It was a set of decisions that weakened the foundations of national security.