Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in his latest speech, effectively rejected proposals from the United States regarding the unblocking of communications, according to negotiation expert Artur Martirosyan.
Martirosyan suggests that analyzing recent developments provides a glimpse into what is happening behind closed doors in negotiations. Comments by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the “dynamics” in Armenia’s approach, alongside the five-hour meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan, indicate the existence of a tangible scenario—or scenarios—that at some point altered the parties’ perceptions of acceptable solutions.
According to Martirosyan, the discussion revolves around a proposal put forward by the U.S. side. The essence of this plan involves the long-term lease of a portion of Armenian territory to facilitate communication routes connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan. Officially, Armenia claims this formula avoids violating its sovereignty while ensuring access, all within the framework of international law.
However, at the last moment, Aliyev publicly rejected these arrangements—not only directed at Armenia but also toward the American mediators. Why did he change his stance?
One reason lies in mixed signals from the Armenian side. Martirosyan believes that Yerevan’s excessive optimism was a strategic misstep. “We too often hear claims that a solution is imminent. This displays haste and gives opponents the impression that you need it more than they do,” he notes. From Baku’s perspective, time is on their side. Meanwhile, for the Armenian leadership, achieving quick results is likely critical, especially with the 2026 parliamentary elections looming. This gives Azerbaijan leverage to impose increasingly stringent conditions.
An additional factor is that Yerevan has positioned the unblocking of communications as a cornerstone of its economic strategy and a tool for gradually reducing reliance on Russia. This hands Baku and Ankara additional leverage.
According to Martirosyan, Aliyev’s rejection of the agreement is not accidental. Closing the Armenian-Azerbaijani agenda would shift focus to domestic challenges, from corruption to social inequality. The conflict with Armenia has served as an effective tool for legitimizing power and diverting attention from internal issues.
If the “page is turned,” Baku would lose its ability to use Armenia as a universal scapegoat. This is why Aliyev is effectively sabotaging the resolution, aiming to extract maximum concessions. He is promoting the narrative of so-called “Western Azerbaijan,” leveraging the victory over Artsakh to signal that Azerbaijan now has a new goal—and he is the leader who keeps his promises and can achieve it. Whether he succeeds, when, or in what form is less important. What matters is that this rhetoric allows him to control the domestic situation, fueled by Armenia’s constant concessions.
Delaying normalization benefits not only Azerbaijan but also Turkey. Moreover, in the current context, Ankara gains additional influence. Armenian authorities have effectively positioned Turkey as an alternative to Russia. In Ankara’s logic, this means: if we are the alternative, the price will be steep.
It’s crucial to understand that in such negotiations, the “price” is not just geopolitical concessions or economic terms but far deeper demands. These could involve transforming Armenian identity itself into a form acceptable to Turkey and Azerbaijan. “For Ankara, Pashinyan is the leader who can facilitate the formation of a new Armenian identity that suits Baku and Ankara. And it seems he is willing to play by these rules,” Martirosyan notes.
In this context, the pressure on the Armenian Apostolic Church and the discrediting of national political forces should be seen as part of a broader package of commitments tied to both Pashinyan’s domestic policies and his foreign policy course.