The results of a new sociological survey conducted by the American International Republican Institute (IRI) from June 16 to 25 and published by Radio Liberty reveal a troubling reality in Armenian politics. Amid internal upheavals, foreign policy uncertainty, and growing social discontent, the country effectively lacks a leader capable of uniting society. The most popular politician in the survey garnered only 13% support—a result that points not to a winner but to the depth of the institutional and moral crisis.
These figures vividly demonstrate that Armenia today is a country without a national authority, with a fragmented and disillusioned electorate. The issue is no longer a struggle between the government and the opposition but a systemic loss of trust in all political forces.
If the current level of political alienation persists, the 2026 parliamentary elections in Armenia could see record-low turnout and limited representation. According to IRI’s June survey, 28% of citizens explicitly stated they do not intend to vote, 12% plan to spoil their ballots, and 22% remain undecided. This means that about 62% of voters—nearly 1.6 million out of 2,573,779 eligible voters—exhibit some form of disengagement from the electoral process.
Even if some of those undecided ultimately vote, the projected turnout, if current trends continue, may not exceed 35–40%, equivalent to 900,000–1,030,000 voters. Formally, the elections will still be valid, as Armenia’s law does not stipulate a minimum turnout threshold. However, in essence, this raises questions about the legitimacy of a government that may be supported by only a small fraction of the electorate.
For instance, if the ruling Civil Contract party maintains its current rating of 17%, it would secure around 174,000 votes—less than 7% of the total electorate. This would result in a legally elected but essentially minority government representing the interests of only a small segment of society. For comparison, in 2021, Pashinyan’s party received about 687,000 votes—nearly four times more.
The political picture painted by the IRI poll is not merely a decline in ratings but a systemic crisis of trust. Pashinyan, while still formally leading the preference list, is losing ground: his rating dropped from 16% to 13% over nine months. Other politicians fail to rise above 5%. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and former President Robert Kocharyan trail far behind, and no opposition force has yet offered a convincing alternative. This confirms the emergence of a political vacuum in which no figure can claim broad representation.
This situation could lead to two scenarios. The first is the consolidation of power, where the current elite, despite declining support, retains control due to a fragmented opposition and low public engagement. This path risks chronic instability, protests, loss of governability, and increased external influence, as a weak government becomes vulnerable.
The second scenario is the emergence of a new political force capable of addressing the demands of the time. A vacuum is not only an absence but also an opportunity for something new. With nearly a year until the elections, the public demand for renewal is evident. The key question is who and how can propose a new agenda capable of inspiring at least part of the disillusioned majority.
This will require not just a charismatic leader but a clear, structured program and a coherent strategy to overcome the crisis. This involves not only politics but also economic and social priorities, the restoration of trust in state institutions, and a sense of justice.
Notably, only 36% of citizens believe the country is moving in the right direction—a figure that has dropped by 10% in nine months. The youth are particularly pessimistic: 54% of respondents aged 18–35 consider the current course mistaken. Yet, this age group is the driver of change, both in terms of electoral mobilization and street activism. A government unable to gain their trust risks losing stability.
Thus, the IRI poll results serve as a signal to the political system. Armenia is entering a phase where formal procedures may diverge from actual public sentiment. If this gap is not bridged, 2026 could bring not renewal but an exacerbation of the crisis across all fronts.