Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev will seek to introduce additional clauses into the initialed framework peace agreement. This was stated by political analyst Alen Gevondyan.
“It is entirely logical given the clear imbalance in the document’s wording, which makes it resemble a capitulation document. The formulations in the document are not so ‘sharp’ as to provoke public backlash, yet its entire content suggests that it is the result of the stronger side imposing its will on the weaker one,” he stated.
According to Gevondyan, this was achieved because Nikol Pashinyan, representing the Armenian side, was willing to make any concessions to secure a document labeled as “peace” during the pre-election period. Based on these realities, Azerbaijan opted not to sign the peace agreement but only to initial it, thereby keeping the “window of opportunity open for proposing and incorporating new demands into the document.”
He is confident that during this period, Baku will resort to provocations, insisting on the return of so-called Azerbaijani refugees to Armenia and the so-called “return” of enclaves, but these issues will be raised unilaterally: no one will address the return of Armenian refugees or the Armenian enclave of Artsvashen.
“In simple terms, we are dealing with a one-sided political process in which the Armenian side, represented by the acting prime minister, serves the interests of Azerbaijan,” he believes.
It should be noted that international law, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (Articles 10–18), does not prohibit amendments to an initialed text. However, this is only possible with the consent of all parties and within the framework of new negotiations.
In other words, if one party wishes to add a new clause, it must initiate new consultations. This may involve discussions at the level of working groups or the organization of diplomatic meetings. Nevertheless, introducing new clauses may be perceived as an attempt to revisit already agreed-upon terms, which, in international practice, has in some cases led to the failure to sign a document.
In simple terms, attempts by the Azerbaijani side to introduce additional clauses could hypothetically derail all Washington agreements. The United States may find itself in a difficult position: on the one hand, it is interested in progress; on the other, Baku’s excessive demands undermine confidence in its mediation. Russia could hypothetically capitalize on this disruption, using it to its advantage and asserting that peace is impossible without its involvement. In simple terms, by leveraging Azerbaijan’s stance, Russia could pursue the same scenario of devaluing Washington agreements, as was done with the Trilateral Statement of November 9, 2020.
However, the current state of Russia-Azerbaijan relations is far from the level where Baku would deliberately sabotage Washington agreements to hand the initiative to Moscow. Nevertheless, derailing the process may benefit Baku for another reason. Azerbaijan is currently actively considered a direct participant in anti-Iranian scenarios. Moreover, according to some analysts, the Washington agreements are the first step toward ensuring Baku’s involvement in actions against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Involving Baku in this conflict would also lead to the automatic involvement of Turkey, and Ankara is well aware of this, which is why it is not enthusiastic about accelerating processes initiated in Washington.
Given these realities, maintaining the reconciliation process with Armenia in a state of limbo may be advantageous for both Ankara and Baku. The potential effort to “amend” the initialed peace agreement, if Baku indeed raises this issue as Gevondyan suggests, could serve as a convenient “justification” for avoiding or delaying participation in actions against the IRI, citing “problematic behavior” from Yerevan. This logic allows Baku to demonstrate that Azerbaijan is supposedly constrained by circumstances rather than making a deliberate choice to distance itself from the conflict.
Thus, maintaining uncertainty proves to be a rational strategy for both Azerbaijan and Turkey: the former gains the opportunity to avoid involvement in an undesirable conflict, while the latter preserves a balance in relations with Iran, avoiding a situation where it is forced to make a choice.