In 2019, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs presented a proposal that Azerbaijan was highly unlikely to accept. At the same time, the political responsibility for rejecting it would have fallen entirely on Baku. Political analyst Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan highlighted this point when discussing the recently published documents on the Karabakh negotiation process.
Why the 2019 proposal was considered acceptable for Armenia
According to Melik-Shahnazaryan, the 2019 document could be viewed as a workable basis for continuing the talks. Artsakh would not have remained fully under Armenian control, but part of the territory would have stayed Armenian. Despite this, the proposal contained several contradictions and clauses that were unacceptable for President Aliyev.
He explains that the talks followed the principle of
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”
This meant that the territorial handover could not take place without agreeing to a referendum in Artsakh.
However, holding such a referendum required Azerbaijan to amend its constitution, which forbade referendums in specific regions considered part of Azerbaijan. For Aliyev, this step carried significant domestic political risks, making it nearly impossible to implement.
Why the burden of rejection would shift to Azerbaijan
Melik-Shahnazaryan believes these internal contradictions were intentionally embedded in the proposal. The wording made the territorial concessions almost unachievable, ensuring that the responsibility for rejecting the plan would rest on Baku.
Under such circumstances, Armenia would not have faced international pressure. The failure would be attributed directly to Azerbaijan.
How Armenia could have preserved the status quo
By agreeing to the Co-Chairs’ proposal, Armenia could have maintained the existing status quo for as long as the balance of power remained intact.
“There was no sharp shift in the military balance before the war,” Melik-Shahnazaryan notes.
He argues that the balance slowly changed after the parties agreed to stop firing, which allowed Azerbaijan to strengthen its positions, build roads between Armenian posts and take control of new areas.
The situation worsened when Armenia began replacing experienced frontline commanders with politically loyal figures, undermining the effectiveness of military leadership.