After making notable progress, Armenia’s Corruption Perceptions Index declined and then stagnated. The indicator remains at a level suggesting that corruption continues to be a serious problem in the country. Anti-corruption security expert Varuzhan Hoktanian made the remarks while assessing the results of Armenia’s fight against corruption.
Impressive Progress Followed by Stagnation
According to him, Armenia’s Corruption Perceptions Index stood at 35 points in 2018 and reached 49 in 2020.
Hoktanian said that, in an international context, this increase was quite impressive.
However, the progress did not continue. The score fell to 46 and in subsequent years largely remained within the 45–47 range.
Hoktanian recalled Armenia’s anti-corruption strategy, which sets a target of reaching 55 points on the Corruption Perceptions Index by the end of 2026.
Transparency International generally publishes the indicator in February of the following year, meaning the final picture of whether Armenia meets its 2026 target will become clear in February 2027.
However, in his assessment, moving from the current 46 points to 55 within such a short period is unlikely.
Hoktanian stressed that Armenia has still not crossed the 50-point threshold.
According to him, a score below 50 means that corruption remains a serious national problem and continues to have a significant impact on the country’s socioeconomic and political development.
The Consequences of Unmet Expectations
According to the expert, expectations among the public, businesses and expert circles regarding the new government played a major role in the sharp improvement of the indicator in 2018–2019.
Those years also saw the start of the process of establishing specialized anti-corruption institutions.
The Corruption Prevention Commission was established, while legislation related to the creation of the Anti-Corruption Committee and the Anti-Corruption Court was adopted.
However, according to Hoktanian, subsequent developments showed that these expectations were not fully met.
At the same time, they did not result in deep disappointment either, since in that case the score could have fallen below 40 again, which did not happen.
Instead, a prolonged period of stagnation emerged.
Among the causes of that stagnation, the expert highlights the events of 2020 — the COVID-19 pandemic and the 44-day war.
In his assessment, particularly while addressing problems that arose during the pandemic, the authorities in some cases returned to previous methods of governance.
At the same time, a significant share of the state apparatus continued to consist of employees inherited from the previous period, while the necessary leadership was not demonstrated to a sufficient degree.
According to Hoktanian, corruption-related problems later emerged in the context of the 44-day war as well, and these developments negatively affected public perceptions.
The Impact of Vote Buying Is Declining
Addressing the issue of vote buying, Hoktanian noted that it is a phenomenon with a long history in Armenia.
At the same time, in his assessment, the effectiveness of vote buying has declined over time.
As an example, he recalled the 2013 presidential election, when, according to him, vote buying was widespread in various cities, yet Raffi Hovannisian won in Gyumri, for instance.
However, in the context of current electoral processes, the expert raises the question of whether law enforcement agencies have responded equally to allegations of vote buying involving all political forces.
He said he had followed statements issued by the Anti-Corruption Committee and the Investigative Committee and noticed that accusations related to vote buying had mainly been directed at representatives of opposition forces.
At the same time, according to Hoktanian, there have been no statements indicating an equivalent law enforcement response to the possible distribution of electoral bribes by the ruling Civil Contract party.
“If it has not been recorded, that does not mean it does not exist,” he said, stressing that the failure of law enforcement bodies to register a case does not in itself prove the absence of such a phenomenon.
Legalized Vote Buying and Administrative Resources
Hoktanian also raises questions regarding the financing of campaign headquarters.
According to him, Civil Contract spent substantial sums during the election period on the operation of campaign offices established in various communities, including villages.
The expert does not rule out the possibility that these financial flows may also have included legalized forms of vote buying.
At the same time, he discussed the possible misuse of administrative resources.
According to Hoktanian, civil society organizations submitted reports on this issue, but he has not seen sufficient information indicating that they were properly followed up.
In the expert’s assessment, all of this may create a public perception of selective justice.
The Consequences of Selective Justice
“If we have selective justice, meaning only those who are opponents of the regime are being targeted, then the corruption perception indicator will definitely deteriorate,” Hoktanian said.
According to him, if the law is strictly enforced against political opponents while the same standards are not applied to representatives of the authorities or the ruling force, this can seriously undermine trust in the anti-corruption effort.
Hoktanian also recalled other possible manifestations of the misuse of administrative resources, particularly cases involving the participation of public-sector employees and schoolchildren in election campaign events.
In his assessment, such phenomena can raise doubts among the public as to whether the anti-corruption campaign is genuinely aimed at resolving systemic corruption problems or, in some cases, is being used to put pressure on political opponents.
“This is a very serious phenomenon,” the expert stressed.