The results of the June 7 parliamentary elections did not represent genuine political competition but rather a predetermined process designed to reproduce the existing government. This opinion was expressed by former Director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Hayk Demoyan.
According to him, by participating in the elections, the opposition effectively became part of the same political scenario, while appeals to the Constitutional Court could never have changed the outcome because, in his view, “the institutions of statehood in Armenia have already lost their real substance.”
There Were No Genuine Elections
Demoyan argues that what took place should not be described as real elections.
“In reality, there were no elections. There was a process aimed at reproducing Nikol Pashinyan’s power. Three months before the vote, I called for a complete boycott because it was already obvious where this process was leading,” he said.
According to the expert, representatives of the authorities demonstrated confidence long before election day that they would remain in parliament regardless of the outcome. He particularly highlights statements made before the official announcement of the results, describing them as evidence of what he calls a “usurpation of power.”
The Issue Extends Beyond the Election Results
Demoyan believes that the problem goes far beyond the outcome of the vote itself.
“If Armenian statehood was already in critical condition before 2018, then the coma was declared during the events of April and May 2018, while the ceremonial funeral occurred when Pashinyan declared ‘the power is mine’ even before the official election results had been announced,” he argued.
In his assessment, although Armenia still retains the external attributes of statehood—including the army, police, taxation system, and official diplomatic visits—these institutions have become little more than formal structures without substantive content.
“Armenia Has Been Divided Between Russia and the West”
Demoyan also claims that recent developments have resulted in what he describes as a “postmodern division” of Armenia between Russian and Western spheres of influence.
According to him, the incumbent authorities received “open external support” during the elections, while Armenian citizens were subjected to what he describes as a policy of intimidation.
He argues that the role of the current prime minister has also changed.
“If previously he could be viewed as the chief executive of a certain structure, today he is more like the manager of various projects. Different external actors can summon him and demand the implementation of particular projects,” Demoyan said.
The Opposition Became Part of the Same Process
According to Demoyan, regardless of its intentions, the opposition became involved in a political process whose principal objective was the reproduction of the current government.
For that reason, he believes it was unrealistic to expect the Constitutional Court to deliver a fundamentally different verdict.
“To this day, no political force has presented convincing evidence that it was not part of a pre-planned political scenario from the very beginning,” he stated.
Half a Million Votes Were Not a Vote of Confidence
Demoyan also disputes the interpretation that the opposition’s electoral support should be viewed as a genuine mandate of confidence.
In his opinion, most of those citizens voted not in favor of particular political parties but against the current government.
“Those 500,000 votes were not an affirmative political choice. They represented a protest against Nikol Pashinyan and the forces that brought him to power. Therefore, the opposition should not become overly encouraged by its electoral results,” he said.
At the same time, Demoyan argues that an increasing number of citizens—including many who supported the 2018 change of government—have come to believe that Armenia is undergoing profound political transformations, leaving what he describes as “three million citizens outside the country’s genuine political processes.”
A Boycott Would Have Been the Better Strategy
Asked what strategy the opposition should have pursued, Demoyan replied that political forces should have boycotted the elections altogether.
According to him, had the opposition refused to participate, it could have immediately launched a new phase of political struggle following the announcement of the election results.
“By refusing to participate, they should have begun concrete political actions as soon as the results were announced. At that moment there was significant mobilization potential, but it was consciously allowed to dissipate,” he said.
In Demoyan’s assessment, what followed instead was a process of accepting parliamentary mandates and justifying that decision, while the appeal to the Constitutional Court became another element of the same political process.