Against the backdrop of a large-scale campaign against the Armenian Apostolic Church and a wave of criminal prosecutions targeting both clergymen and figures from the opposition field, the actions of Armenia’s titular opposition appear at best sluggish. The leader of the largest opposition parliamentary faction — the “Armenia” bloc — has left the country for vacation amid intense political turbulence. The second-largest parliamentary opposition faction, although it initiated an impeachment discussion, has shown neither readiness nor much desire for active engagement. A logical question arises: why, at a moment when socio-political tensions are peaking, is the opposition choosing to remain on the sidelines? Is this a strategic pause, internal demobilization, or a retreat from the fight?
Politics in Vacation Mode — Tensions Accumulating Toward Autumn
Despite loud statements about the “inevitable collapse of Pashinyan’s regime,” there have been no actual developments in recent months that could lead to mass street mobilization. While the authorities have employed heavy-handed tactics — such as the high-profile arrests of Samvel Karapetyan, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, and Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan — none of these incidents sparked a real wave of protest.
The largest public gathering occurred in response to Ajapahyan’s arrest, as people reacted to law enforcement actions in the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin. Yet even there, there was no sense of a broader mobilization. Clergy rang the bells, citizens voiced their outrage — but the kind of protest energy typical of emerging powerful movements was lacking. There was dissatisfaction, but no will for long-term or large-scale resistance. The momentum collapsed completely when Ajapahyan himself announced that he would not be running for prime minister. That announcement essentially deflated the protest entirely.
The opposition’s behavior is also telling. Despite the tense political atmosphere, “Armenia” bloc leader Robert Kocharyan quietly left for vacation. According to reports, vacations within the bloc have already been scheduled through the end of summer — suggesting that the largest parliamentary opposition force does not plan to take any steps in the coming months.
The team of Serzh Sargsyan, which represents the second parliamentary opposition force, has acted more actively, but its efforts often resemble political theater. This is especially evident in the nomination of a potential prime ministerial candidate who lacks public recognition and broad support — essentially, a “technical figure.”
The lack of protest activity is also linked to external factors. In Armenia, from mid-July to the end of August, political life traditionally slows down. This is the peak of summer heat and vacation season. Such seasonal dynamics are always factored into political strategy — it is difficult to organize mass street protests when most politically active citizens are traveling or in holiday mode. The current authorities are clearly taking advantage of this by removing opponents with little resistance.
Autumn as a Political Crossroads?
There is a growing sense that both sides — the government and the opposition — are consciously preparing for the autumn. But what exactly are they waiting for?
On one hand, Pashinyan’s aggressive crackdown on opponents — especially the Armenian Apostolic Church — may not be merely a show of force, but part of a broader strategy. It’s quite possible that the government is preparing painful and highly unpopular foreign policy decisions. These may involve meeting demands from Turkey and Azerbaijan, in the context of a proposed peace agreement — or more precisely, the annexes to such a document. These concessions could span a wide range: from granting a corridor through Syunik and accepting Azerbaijani presence on Armenian territory, to relinquishing all moral, symbolic, and legal claims in Ankara and Baku.
Viewed from this angle, Pashinyan’s preemptive suppression of resistance — particularly from traditional and national institutions like the church — becomes understandable. The neutralization of clergy, delegitimization of the opposition, and labeling of opponents as “agents of Moscow” may all be part of a plan to clean the political field before entering a decisive phase.
In this context, accusations by ruling party figures toward external actors — particularly Russia — allegedly planning an “operation” against the government are also notable. None of these claims have been supported by evidence, suggesting a deliberate attempt to preemptively discredit any potential protest as a foreign conspiracy.
Equally intriguing is the internal dynamic within the opposition. There’s a strong sense that key opposition figures are also waiting for a signal. Until that signal arrives, active steps have been postponed. This is particularly evident in the case of the “Armenia” bloc, whose leader Robert Kocharyan traveled to Moscow twice last spring. Shortly after these visits, tensions between him and Serzh Sargsyan became more visible. Sargsyan began both publicly and privately pushing Kocharyan to take action, while Kocharyan clearly hesitated.
It’s possible that Sargsyan, lacking similar support in Moscow, tried to pressure Kocharyan externally — either to discredit him among local elites or to force him to break possible “commitments” made to the Kremlin, such as a promise to refrain from political action before September. In this scenario, Sargsyan’s behavior reflects both political jealousy and calculation: an attempt to regain initiative or at least prevent Kocharyan from consolidating his position as the sole “pro-Russian” figure in the opposition camp.
If this scenario holds water, then Pashinyan likely knows it, too. His actions may thus reflect not only preparations for foreign policy concessions but also an attempt to deny his opponents time and space to organize. He may be trying to shake the system before any external plans unfold in the fall — while at the same time crafting a narrative for the West: that his harsh measures are merely defensive responses to revanchist and pro-Kremlin plots.
In this light, the autumn could become a point of convergence for multiple tensions: foreign policy (the peace deal or its components), domestic politics (a potential reawakening of the opposition), and geopolitics (rising external pressure on both Pashinyan and his challengers).