The escalation of the military confrontation between the United States and Iran resulted from a poorly calculated strategy in which Washington overestimated the value of its military superiority and underestimated the distinctive features of Iran’s state and defense system. This assessment was offered by Stepan Grigoryan, head of the Analytical Center on Globalization and Regional Cooperation.
According to him, the United States and Israel believed their substantial military advantage over Iran would allow them to achieve their objectives quickly through force.
However, that approach was not based on a comprehensive understanding of regional realities or the internal structure of the Iranian state.
Trump Expected One Decisive Strike to Solve a Complex Problem
Grigoryan argues that Donald Trump’s political thinking differs considerably from that of previous US presidents.
Trump tends to believe that even the most complicated international problems can be resolved through one decisive strike backed by American military superiority.
The analyst links this approach partly to Trump’s business background, which encourages an overly simplified view of relations between states as transactions, pressure campaigns and efforts to secure immediate results.
Grigoryan recalled that during the initial stage of the military campaign, Trump claimed that most of Iran’s military capabilities had been destroyed.
Subsequent developments, however, demonstrated that Iran retained an operational army, police forces and special units and continued to mount effective resistance.
According to Grigoryan, one reason for the US president’s strategic miscalculations is his limited trust in American intelligence and national security institutions.
Trump frequently disregards their assessments, he argues, leaving Washington in a much more difficult situation than it expected at the beginning of the conflict.
The Attempt to Control the Strait of Hormuz Also Failed
The political analyst also addressed the energy dimension of the confrontation.
He says Trump expected to establish control over oil flows passing through the Strait of Hormuz, similar to previous American attempts to influence energy routes in other regions.
In Iran’s case, however, that calculation also proved incorrect because the region’s geography, military balance and political realities are fundamentally different.
Control over the Strait of Hormuz cannot be secured through military superiority alone.
Iran retains substantial capabilities to disrupt navigation, threaten energy infrastructure and affect security throughout the region.
Even a Third War Will Not Achieve Washington’s Objectives
Grigoryan describes the current large-scale hostilities as a third war against Iran.
Nevertheless, he believes that even greater military pressure will not enable Washington to achieve its stated objectives.
Iran’s state and military administration are designed to continue functioning even after severe strikes against central leadership bodies and command infrastructure.
As an example, he points to constitutional and institutional mechanisms that allow authority to be rapidly decentralized during a crisis.
Military command can be transferred to provincial levels, enabling the system to remain operational even if central command centers are destroyed or disrupted.
A Ground Operation Would Be Extremely Difficult and Expensive
Grigoryan considers this decentralized structure one of Iran’s principal advantages.
For that reason, any large-scale ground operation against the country would be exceptionally difficult, prolonged and costly.
Even if the United States attempts limited operations on islands near the Strait of Hormuz, he argues, such actions would not fundamentally alter the overall military and political balance.
They would neither destroy Iran’s governing system nor eliminate Tehran’s ability to continue resisting.
“The United States still possesses enormous military superiority, but that does not mean it can impose its will by force. Trump appears to be trying to compete with a chess player through physical strength, while the chess player is following his own rules,” Grigoryan said.
Military Superiority Does Not Guarantee Political Victory
According to the analyst, Washington’s central mistake is equating military superiority with the ability to secure a political outcome.
The United States can carry out devastating strikes, destroy infrastructure and inflict substantial damage, but that does not mean Iran will accept American demands.
Tehran possesses institutional resilience, a large territory, a substantial population and a governing system designed for prolonged resistance.
Major military losses therefore do not necessarily lead to political capitulation or a change in the country’s strategic course.
The Promised Decline in Energy Prices Never Materialized
Grigoryan also highlighted the economic consequences of the war.
He recalled that Trump had promised military action and greater American control over energy flows would reduce energy prices.
The actual outcome has been the opposite.
Oil prices have continued rising not only in Europe but also in the United States.
Military instability, threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and uncertainty over supplies increase insurance, transportation and market costs.
The economic consequences of the confrontation therefore contradict Washington’s initial claims that military pressure could stabilize the global energy market.
Business Logic Obscures Complex Geopolitical Realities
Grigoryan argues that Donald Trump’s worldview is largely shaped by business logic, under which international relations are treated as a series of transactions.
Within this framework, pressure, higher stakes and displays of strength are expected to force the other party to accept terms more favorable to the United States.
The analyst believes this logic is poorly suited to complex geopolitical conflicts, particularly when confronting states with durable institutions, a powerful ideological system and decades of experience resisting external pressure.
This simplified interpretation of international politics, he argues, prevents Washington from accurately assessing Iran’s behavior and contributes to flawed strategic decisions.
Negotiating With Tehran Remains Extremely Difficult
At the same time, Grigoryan agrees that negotiations with Iran have always been exceptionally difficult.
Tehran rarely makes genuine and final concessions, he says.
Iranian officials may signal readiness for compromise, participate in prolonged talks and create the impression that positions are converging.
In practice, however, such concessions are either never implemented or are designed in ways that leave the Iranian state’s fundamental interests untouched.
“It may appear that Iran is prepared to compromise, but in practice such concessions are never carried out,” Stepan Grigoryan concluded.