The issue of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” extends far beyond the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, according to Middle East expert Tigran Yegavian.
He argues that, in reality, it is a geopolitical project involving both regional and global players, with the fate of Syunik becoming part of a much broader game. Yegavian emphasized that the corridor idea dates back to the 2000s, when the Minsk Group discussed the so-called “Goble Plan.” At that time, an exchange of corridors—Lachin and Zangezur—was considered, with Azerbaijan aiming to secure a connection to Nakhichevan. However, while Armenia focuses on unblocking communications while preserving sovereignty, such as through the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, Azerbaijan insists on an extraterritorial corridor that would exclude Armenian control.
Turkey supports this formula, as do several Western countries, particularly the United Kingdom and Israel, according to the expert. “For them, it’s a tool to weaken Russian influence and create an alternative route for exporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian region. The U.S. is also interested, but only if it can control the process. This has become especially relevant after setbacks in Ukraine—the corridor could be a ‘successful deal’ and even a potential opportunity for image-driven diplomacy, like a Nobel Peace Prize,” Yegavian stated.
However, Yerevan speaks of “unblocking,” while Baku insists on a “corridor,” and the gap between these approaches is vast. Azerbaijan continues its policy of incremental pressure—the so-called “salami strategy,” slicing away at Armenia’s resilience demographically, territorially, and energetically. Yegavian points out that Armenia suffers from multi-layered instability: demographic (population outflow and disparity with Azerbaijan), energy (dependence on Russian gas), food (reliance on Russian grain), and cultural-political (conflict with the church and societal polarization). In such conditions, Azerbaijan is confident that Armenia is unable to effectively defend itself or implement reforms.
According to Yegavian, Armenian leaders are adept at tactics but weak in strategy. They act step-by-step without a long-term vision. Armenia is a mountainous country, he says, and in the mountains, you need to look 360 degrees. He sees this lacking in both the diplomacy and defense of the current government. “It’s a paradox: Armenians are excellent chess players but not strategists,” he remarks.
For Iran, the emergence of an extraterritorial corridor is a geopolitical nightmare. Israel is already present through Azerbaijan, and now there’s a risk of increased U.S. influence, creating an American-Israeli alliance on Iran’s northern border. Tehran cannot wage a direct war with Azerbaijan, and proxy structures, like those in Lebanon or Yemen, are absent in the region. Today, Iran supports Armenia’s territorial integrity not out of altruism but to maintain a land corridor to Russia.
Thus, Yegavian says, Iran is playing a complex diplomatic game but from a weakened position: it faces pressure from Israel, is losing leverage over Azerbaijan, and does not see Yerevan as a reliable partner. In Tehran, they distrust Pashinyan, viewing him as a pro-Western technocrat without a strategy. The challenge, he adds, is that Armenian policy remains reactive—responding to events rather than shaping the agenda.