The Washington Summit between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States marked one of the key diplomatic events in the region in recent years. At first glance, it may appear as a step toward peace, but experts warn: the document primarily reflects Azerbaijan’s interests and lacks international security guarantees for Armenia. Whether the initialed agreement will lead to a genuine resolution of the conflict remains an open question.
A Culmination of U.S. Relations, Not a Peace Deal
According to political scientist Richard Kirakosyan, the Washington Summit should be seen more as a culmination of negotiations between Armenia and the U.S., as well as Azerbaijan and the U.S., rather than a classic bilateral peace agreement. The expert believes that the format of the meeting diminishes the practical prospects for achieving lasting peace. “I am skeptical about whether the initialed peace treaty will actually work in practice. We are dealing with a diplomatic document without international guarantees or the involvement of an international guarantor.”
Kirakosyan argues that the foundation of this agreement still rests on Azerbaijan’s use of force. Given Baku’s authoritarian nature and lack of democratic institutions, Armenia cannot be confident in the reliability of its peace partner. In such conditions, the treaty resembles a “punitive peace.” Essentially, the agreement appears as a victory of authoritarian Azerbaijan over democratic Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
An Agreement Under Baku’s Control
According to expert Armen Baghdasaryan, it is premature to claim that peace is near. The content of the agreement predominantly reflects Azerbaijan’s interests: Baku concedes almost nothing, while its previous demands on Armenia remain in place, as the treaty does not restrict their imposition. He is convinced that Armenia not only gained nothing but, in several cases, incurred losses.
For instance, the parties agreed to withdraw their claims from international courts. The issue is that Azerbaijan’s claims were weakly substantiated and unlikely to succeed, unlike Armenia’s claims. From this perspective, this provision of the agreement is more of an achievement for Baku and a missed opportunity for Yerevan.
Baghdasaryan draws particular attention to the clause prohibiting the deployment of “third forces” along the borders. In his view, this clause could affect the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA), which may be forced to leave the region. In simpler terms, this article gives Azerbaijan a tool to limit the presence of external actors on the border, especially before the completion of delimitation and demarcation. Under such conditions, Baku could, after removing “witnesses,” initiate aggression while blaming Armenia, as has happened multiple times in the past.