The Memorandum of Understanding between Armenia and the United States regarding the “Crossroads of Peace” project has finally been published, three weeks after its signing and amid numerous speculations about the reasons for the delay. At first glance, the document appears to be a framework agreement, implying no binding obligations or funding. However, it contains several points that warrant closer attention. This article focuses on the provision in the memorandum concerning cooperation in customs control, border security, and cybersecurity, including the exchange of expertise with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Technical Risks
On one hand, cooperation could enhance Armenia’s technical capabilities and resilience in infrastructure and border security. On the other hand, it poses a potential risk of dependency on external technologies and consultants. Such dependency arises when critical systems are developed or maintained by foreign entities. In critical situations involving the management of cargo flows or border procedures, the operation of these systems may be limited until coordinated with external specialists.
For instance, if border and customs systems are partially managed by foreign services or equipment, their configuration and updates will depend on external experts. In an emergency—such as a sudden change in cargo volumes—delays in specialist intervention could restrict local authorities’ ability to promptly adapt systems.
Moreover, some security and cybersecurity solutions in such scenarios will require compliance with U.S. standards. If a situation demands rapid local solutions that do not align with U.S. protocols, the system may be temporarily blocked pending approval, leading to delays in border or transit hub operations.
Political Risks
There are also political implications tied to the Trilateral Declaration signed during the Washington Summit on August 8. If Azerbaijan or other external actors, such as Turkey, insist on a specific framework for transport corridors or customs control, and the systems and experts rely on U.S. technologies and consultations, the U.S. could limit access to these resources or suspend their operation in an “agreed format” to avoid conflict with other parties.
As a party to international law and regional agreements, the U.S. will aim to act in a way that does not violate formal or de facto arrangements between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other actors. In the context of TRIPP, where Yerevan and Baku already interpret the concept of “unimpeded connectivity” differently, this implies that, ultimately, the order established on Armenia’s sovereign territory will be determined by the U.S., referencing its own interpretation of “existing agreements.”
Intersection of Two Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The situation is further complicated by Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Within the EAEU, border and customs procedures, transit, and goods movement are governed by unified rules and regulations that set standards, procedures, and controls. Armenia has committed to ensuring that EAEU procedures apply at all its borders, including the corridor through Syunik to Nakhichevan.
The TRIPP Declaration enshrines the principle of “unimpeded connectivity” between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, while the memorandum with the U.S. envisages the adoption of American standards for security, border control, and cybersecurity. If U.S. technologies and experts are used on routes affecting Azerbaijan’s transit, their actions will be guided by both TRIPP and U.S. standards. However, some of these standards may partially conflict with EAEU regulations, for example, in procedures for cargo inspection, control, and data exchange.
For Armenia, this creates the challenge of dual compliance: simultaneously adhering to EAEU regulations while ensuring compliance with TRIPP principles when using U.S. technologies. Any discrepancies could lead to legal and operational uncertainties.