Political analyst Marina Brutyan is confident that no agreements on communications will be reached in the U.S.
“The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev, will not discuss the most contentious issue in their bilateral relations—the so-called ‘Zangezur Corridor’—in Washington. The U.S., as a mediator, will not push for delving into this inherently dead-end topic to avoid derailing the dialogue,” Brutyan notes.
According to her, even if the parties wish to discuss logistics or transport links, the concept of a “corridor” remains vague and legally explosive. Therefore, discussions will likely focus on “safer” issues, such as humanitarian matters, economic cooperation, and border demarcation.
“The corridor issue touches on Armenia’s sovereignty, which is one of Yerevan’s ‘red lines.’ Any mention of the word ‘corridor’ is perceived as a threat to territorial integrity. Notably, the EU, particularly France, also urges focusing on unblocking routes without compromising sovereignty. The EU (especially Charles Michel), France, and the U.S. advocate for a diplomatic resolution where corridor issues are part of a broader package rather than a standalone pressure point. It’s too risky a topic to address directly, especially in meetings aimed at aligning positions and achieving a formal peace agreement,” she explains.
Brutyan predicts that Baku is unlikely to strongly push for the immediate unblocking of this route, keeping it as a tool for manipulation, as Azerbaijan can utilize alternative routes through Iran.
“It’s important to understand that Baku’s main goal is to establish a permanent land connection with Nakhichevan, leading to Turkey and, through it, to Europe. The Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan-Turkey link opens a direct path to EU markets, bypassing Armenia and Georgia. This is particularly crucial for energy resources, transportation, logistics, and freight. Additionally, Baku aims to position itself as a central logistics hub in Eurasia, particularly in the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor). The more alternative routes, the greater the country’s role in geoeconomics. The route through Iran from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan is already operational, running through southern Azerbaijan (Astara) and northwestern Iran. Iran allows cargo transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. This route does not require concessions from Armenia and is controlled by Baku and Tehran. Another project, the Rasht-Astara railway (Iran), is nearly complete. This joint project of Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan will connect Iran with Azerbaijan and Russia within the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Azerbaijan also seeks to be part of this axis, including for trade with India and back,” the expert notes.
Commenting on what Azerbaijan gains from developing the Iranian route, Brutyan highlights that it ensures independence from the political climate in Yerevan, provides an alternative in case Armenian-Azerbaijani agreements falter, strengthens Azerbaijan’s role as a transit power, offers access to Turkey and Arab countries via Nakhichevan and Iran, and enables participation in major Chinese and Iranian initiatives.
“This doesn’t mean Azerbaijan is abandoning the idea of a corridor through Syunik. It’s acting pragmatically: if Armenia blocks this route, Baku strengthens ties with Iran while increasing political pressure on Yerevan. Whether the corridor issue exists or not is irrelevant—Baku is developing alternative routes regardless. Armenia’s refusal to allow a corridor won’t corner Azerbaijan, which can afford diplomatic flexibility. Azerbaijan has a Plan B, C, and D,” Brutyan states.
She emphasizes that Azerbaijan will not entirely abandon the idea of a route through Syunik. The term “corridor” will persist in domestic and Turkic discourse, and Baku will promote projects with Turkey, citing logistical connections, while seeking to expand its influence over time. Azerbaijan’s leadership, she continues, aims to maintain its image as a “victor” without sparking new confrontations: Ilham Aliyev has already won in Karabakh, and now he needs not to win a semantic dispute but to secure transport connectivity.
“The situation around the Zangezur Corridor is often perceived externally as a rigid conflict between Baku and Yerevan, with each side clinging to its terms. The corridor issue is undoubtedly a strategic priority. However, it’s equally important to remember that directly imposing terminology that Armenia sees as a threat to its sovereignty could derail negotiations and escalate the conflict. This is in no one’s interest. Therefore, at the Washington summit, the parties will likely try to sidestep this issue. Talks at the White House may focus on continuing border demarcation or legal guarantees that Azerbaijan will not encroach on Armenian territory,” Brutyan concludes.