Armenia’s Electoral Code allows elected candidates to refuse parliamentary mandates and provides legal procedures for such cases. Under current regulations, mandates remain vacant if candidates decline them or withdraw their candidacies. However, constitutional law expert Vardan Poghosyan believes that under Armenia’s current political circumstances, the situation may develop differently.
Parliament Could End Up With Only One Political Force
According to Poghosyan, if opposition parties that have entered parliament refuse to take their mandates and all candidates on their electoral lists also withdraw, the National Assembly could effectively be left with representation from only one political force.
“If the three opposition groups completely reject their mandates, the National Assembly could end up with only 60 members,” he stated.
In his view, the more important issue is not the formal legitimacy of such a parliament but the political consequences that could follow.
The Authorities Could Change the Rules
Poghosyan argues that under such circumstances the Civil Contract party could attempt to challenge relevant provisions of the Electoral Code before the courts or amend the legislation through parliament.
This could create a pathway for bringing into parliament political forces that participated in the election and are viewed as supportive of the ruling party.
“I do not believe Armenia will have a parliament of only 60 members until 2031,” he noted.
Refusing Mandates Would Not Benefit the Opposition
For this reason, the constitutional expert considers calls for opposition parties to reject their mandates to be misguided.
According to him, such a move would not advance the opposition’s political objectives.
Even if the government initially refrains from changing legislation, it would continue governing, while future efforts would likely focus on filling vacant parliamentary seats.
The Government Would Lose Its Supermajority
Poghosyan noted that if opposition parties take their mandates, and Prosperous Armenia enters parliament, the balance of power would leave Civil Contract with approximately 60 seats against a combined opposition bloc of around 45 seats.
Under those circumstances, the ruling party would possess neither a three-fifths majority nor a two-thirds majority.
“If Pashinyan does not have a three-fifths majority, he cannot independently amend constitutional laws,” Poghosyan explained.
Major Appointments Require Opposition Support
The constitutional lawyer emphasized that a three-fifths majority is necessary not only for constitutional legislation but also for a range of key state appointments.
These include judges of the Constitutional Court and Court of Cassation, members of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Prosecutor General, the Human Rights Defender, members of the Television and Radio Commission, and members of the Central Electoral Commission.
“In such cases Civil Contract would be forced to nominate candidates who are also acceptable to opposition factions,” he said.
According to Poghosyan, this requirement reflects the original logic of Armenia’s 2015 constitutional reforms, which sought to encourage compromise and cooperation between government and opposition.
Constitutional Reform Would Become More Difficult
Poghosyan also noted that launching a referendum on a new Constitution requires the support of at least two-thirds of parliament.
Since the ruling party lacks such a majority, advancing constitutional reform would become significantly more difficult.
“This means Pashinyan will not be able to achieve what many consider his main political objective in the new parliament,” he stated.
Vacant Seats Could Be Filled by Pro-Government Forces
The expert concluded that if opposition parties ultimately refuse their mandates, the authorities may seek ways to fill parliament with political forces that support the government.
“If the opposition gives up its mandates, Pashinyan will most likely fill the parliament with proxy political forces,” Poghosyan concluded.