Ensuring a simplified passage in one format or another through the territory of Syunik from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan and Turkey became almost inevitable from the moment Armenia lost control over Artsakh. This was stated by political analyst Beniamin Poghosyan.
According to Poghosyan, this reality can be compared to a severe viral illness: if the cause exists, the consequences are also inevitable. In his assessment, it was already clear in November 2020 that what remained of Artsakh was not a viable entity, and after September 2023 — following the destruction of the Republic of Artsakh and ethnic cleansing — Azerbaijan was bound to resolve the issue of a passage through Syunik.
The worst-case scenario and the inevitability of a “third party”
According to the political analyst, the question was not whether there would be a passage, but what kind it would be. The worst-case scenario was the full or partial occupation of Syunik, possibly also involving certain parts of Vayots Dzor. Another option was ensuring the passage with the involvement of a third major state.
Poghosyan emphasizes that the issue is not limited to relations between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. It also concerns routes connecting Central Asia with Europe, the development of the Organization of Turkic States, and the interests of much more powerful actors. Therefore, he believes that the involvement of a third state was almost inevitable if the scenario of outright occupation did not materialize.
According to the analyst, initially this role was played by Russia, and at present by the United States.
The war in Ukraine and the shift in the balance of power
In Poghosyan’s assessment, U.S. involvement became possible primarily because Russia failed to quickly conclude the war in Ukraine. Had the war ended in 2022 or at least during 2023, Artsakh might have continued to exist, albeit not in a fully viable form, and the topic of a “corridor” or TRIPP would not have appeared on the agenda.
However, the war now entering its fourth year, Russia’s inability to impose its will, and the shift in the regional balance of power, according to the analyst, opened new opportunities for other actors.
Armenia’s foreign policy: reaction rather than strategy
Poghosyan is convinced that Armenia’s foreign policy since November 2020 has not been based on a long-term, well-calculated strategy. Instead, it has been largely reactive, shaped by a rapidly changing external environment and acute security crises.
According to him, in 2021 Armenia had a clearly “pro-Russian” positioning — from arms contracts to political statements. However, against the backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine war and Azerbaijan’s growing military pressure — from the events in Parukh to the closure of the Lachin Corridor and the large-scale attack on Armenia in September 2022 — it became evident that Russia either could not or did not want to restrain Baku.
Under these conditions, the analyst notes, Yerevan faced the question of who could stop Aliyev, backed by Turkey as well. From that moment, a “diversification” of foreign policy began and a turn toward the West followed, including the intensification of anti-Russian rhetoric, the deployment of an EU monitoring mission, and the October 2022 statement recognizing Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan.
Unmet expectations and a new turn
According to Poghosyan, expectations that Russian peacekeepers or the West would prevent ethnic cleansing in Artsakh were not fulfilled. In 2024, when it became clear that the scenario of Russia’s “total isolation” was exaggerated, Armenia attempted to partially restore relations with Moscow.
However, in early 2025, when ultimatum-style messages from Azerbaijan resurfaced under the logic of “corridor or war,” the question of who could prevent the occupation of Syunik once again became relevant. Russia remained absorbed in the war, Iran was weakened, and under these conditions, the analyst believes, the TRIPP format was considered as an option to prevent the full or partial occupation of Syunik.
The reason for contradictory statements
Poghosyan emphasizes that over the past four years the regional situation has changed dramatically several times, and Armenia’s authorities have tried to adapt to these changes without a clear strategic line. In his view, this reactive approach explains the frequent contradictory statements made by the authorities.