Amid reports of a potential meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Washington, it appears that processes surrounding the resolution of the South Caucasus conflict are entering a phase of acceleration. According to media reports, the meeting could take place in the coming days, with its outcome potentially being a statement of intent to sign a peace agreement.
Will the Meeting Take Place?
Despite the lack of official confirmation from Yerevan or Baku, the possibility of a meeting between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington cannot be dismissed. Discussions about a potential U.S.-hosted meeting began circulating in Armenia almost a week after a meeting in Abu Dhabi. Moreover, the nature of the leak—combined with the fact that it has not been outright denied by the Armenian government—suggests, at the very least, that such a scenario is being discussed at high levels. Additionally, the U.S. has been systematically creating a positive information backdrop for weeks: earlier, Donald Trump spoke of a “miracle” achieved by the U.S. in the region, and now Republican Senator Steve Daines openly states that the parties are “on the verge of concluding a historic agreement,” portraying Trump as the chief architect of this achievement. The hypothesis is further supported by the synchronized activity of regional players: shortly after the media leak, a phone call took place between the foreign ministers of Turkey and Azerbaijan, which appears to be a coordination of positions ahead of a possible event. Thus, given the current context, the likelihood of a Washington meeting seems high. At the very least, as a political signal, it has already begun to play its role.
Why Is Washington in a Hurry?
Despite the apparent intrigue surrounding a possible Washington meeting, the statements from the U.S. side are largely unsupported by real diplomatic progress. On the contrary, after Armenia and Azerbaijan officially announced that all points of a peace treaty had been agreed upon, Baku began introducing new preconditions—effectively stalling the process. The positions of the parties remain unchanged, and no substantive steps toward reconciliation have been taken in recent weeks. Against this backdrop, claims of a “miracle” or being “on the verge of a historic agreement” appear more like political PR than a reflection of diplomatic reality. This raises a legitimate question: why is Trump so persistently pushing the idea of a breakthrough in the South Caucasus when there are no objective grounds for it yet?
The answer may lie in a broader geopolitical context, primarily in the U.S. strategy to contain Iran. The South Caucasus, especially given Armenia’s changing status, is becoming a key platform for reshaping regional influence. Under the current government, Armenia is increasingly distancing itself from Russia and unsuccessfully seeking support in the West, but this desire may be exploited by the U.S. to advance its own agenda.
U.S. activity in normalizing relations between Yerevan and Baku may, in reality, create conditions for a more active American presence in the region—whether through military cooperation, intelligence activities, or infrastructure projects. It may be advantageous for the U.S. to turn the South Caucasus into a zone of political control or at least influence, from which it would be easier to exert pressure on Iran, monitor its ties with Russia and China, and block the development of Iranian logistical initiatives, such as the North-South International Transport Corridor.
Securing the Region and Engaging Baku
Thus, Washington’s activity, and particularly Trump’s, may be driven not so much by a genuine desire for peace between Yerevan and Baku but by a wish to quickly secure the region as part of its own geopolitical strategy. In this scenario, Armenia and Azerbaijan are merely pieces in a larger game, where the primary goal is not lasting peace but a convenient geopolitical framework for the next stage of confrontation.
This hypothesis is supported by another fact: according to Reuters’ diplomatic sources, the U.S. is discussing the possibility of Azerbaijan joining the so-called Abraham Accords, with an agreement potentially reached within weeks. Trump views a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a prerequisite for involving Baku in this framework. In other words, the presumed “Washington meeting” may aim not so much at achieving lasting peace but at clearing diplomatic space for a broader anti-Iran configuration, into which the U.S. seeks to integrate Azerbaijan and the entire region. Iran’s heightened anxiety and mutual grievances between Baku and Tehran indicate that Iran is well aware of the dangers posed by Washington’s initiatives.
Engaging Azerbaijan in an anti-Iran configuration requires reciprocal steps from Washington that align with Baku’s interests. This raises a highly sensitive issue for Armenia—the possibility of concessions regarding the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which Azerbaijan has been pushing for years as a land corridor bypassing Armenia’s sovereign control.
Armenia’s Interests as a Bargaining Chip
If Baku is drawn into a confrontation with Iran, the Iranian route becomes unacceptable. Consequently, Azerbaijan must be offered an alternative—a strategically secure and fully controlled land route to Nakhchivan bypassing Iran. The only viable option is a route through southern Armenia.
In this context, it becomes clear why Trump and his team are so actively promoting the idea of a “peace agreement” or an “American unblocking scenario.” For the U.S., focused on creating an anti-Iran sanitary corridor from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea, the issue of Armenian sovereignty in Syunik may be secondary—especially if strategic agreements with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and several Gulf states are at stake.
In simpler terms, Armenia’s interests may be treated as “expendable” in a larger geopolitical game. This is not a new logic in global politics and certainly not an exception in the approach of the Trump administration. Moreover, Armenia, which in recent years has failed to secure clear guarantees for its position from either the West or other power centers, may end up being the weak party whose expense buys a loyal ally in Baku.