Armenia’s domestic political life is entering another tense phase amid deepening debates around the electoral process, the reconfiguration of the opposition landscape, and the possible reproduction of power. Public discourse is increasingly dominated by key questions: is genuine opposition consolidation possible, does a viable alternative to the current authorities exist, and what scenarios should be expected after the upcoming elections?
These and a number of other crucial issues were addressed by political figure Gor Hovhannisyan, who presented his assessments of potential opposition formats, electoral scenarios, the authorities’ propaganda narratives, and post-election developments.
How realistic do you consider the consolidation of the opposition at this stage? In what format could it take place, and between which forces?
The consolidation of the opposition is not only desirable but strategically essential. In my view, the opposition will form two to three major pre-election blocs capable of posing a serious challenge to the current authorities.
It is important to clearly understand that in these elections the consolidation process will be significantly broader and deeper than before. This is no longer about rallying around a single leader. It is a complex, multi-layered negotiation process that depends on the level of mutual trust among political forces, their negotiating capacity and flexibility, the compatibility of their ideological approaches, and—most importantly—the ability to formulate a realistic, convincing, and socially comprehensible common agenda.
Despite serious obstacles, mistrust, and disagreements, the creation of large blocs offers far greater opportunities than fragmented and unsystematic participation by small forces.
Do you believe there is a politician today who can realistically assume the responsibility of prime minister and lead the country out of the crisis? Whom do you see in this role?
Yes, there are several figures and teams in Armenia’s political field capable of ensuring more responsible, flexible, and adequate governance with rapid responses to unfolding challenges. Armenia’s domestic reality shows that the crisis requires professional leaders with managerial, negotiating, and economic experience—leaders who can balance competing interests, ensure stability, and propose clear development programs in foreign policy, the economy, and security.
These may include both well-known political figures and new teams or ideological forces capable of developing realistic solutions.
It should also be noted that a more centralized model of governance could act as a counterbalance to the internal crisis factors of recent years—from inter-party conflicts to the inefficiency of executive and legislative institutions. Ultimately, success will depend not only on personalities but also on a unified opposition strategy and public support in the 2026 elections.
When you speak of new faces, whom exactly do you mean?
I primarily meant that Armenia’s political field includes several actors who, beyond former presidents, possess significant potential. In particular, there are figures who maintain close and trust-based relations with leaders of states allied with Armenia. If successful, such connections could ensure tangible progress—both in foreign policy and in the economy and security sphere.
Moreover, mutual respect within the opposition field is critically important. If the real objective is a change of power, personal feuds, mutual accusations, and an atmosphere of distrust must be put aside. Only on the basis of respect, cooperation, and consolidation around a shared goal can a real force emerge—one capable of challenging the current authorities and achieving change.
How do you assess the chances of the current authorities reproducing themselves in the upcoming elections? Do you see risks of electoral violations?
According to expert assessments, the probability of the current authorities reproducing themselves is approaching zero. If the elections are held under conditions of lawful competition, within the electoral rules, and without large-scale falsifications, a change of power in the 2026 elections will be inevitable.
It is evident—and recent polls confirm this—that public sentiment is increasingly marked by deep disappointment and fatigue linked to the ruling force’s governance and the crises of recent years. However, the election outcome will hinge on one key factor: legitimacy.
Given its low approval ratings, as recorded by sociological studies (even lower than on the eve of the 2021 elections), the prime minister’s team is likely to make extensive use of administrative resources. In particular, mass registration of Indian citizens as voters cannot be ruled out, with the aim of securing votes in favor of the authorities.
In addition, the army and police structures may be used in the interests of the authorities—to control the electoral process and exert pressure.
At the final stage of the campaign, “show” actions in the form of arrests of opposition candidates or activists are also possible.
However, if repression and falsification cross society’s “red lines,” this could lead to large-scale public protests and possibly a scenario of a real political revolution.
At the same time, regardless of these risks, the opposition must focus not only on the technical oversight of elections but, above all, on increasing public participation, strengthening trust in the electoral process, and convincing citizens that change is possible. This will be the key factor in preventing the reproduction of power.
The authorities actively promote the narrative that their alternative is a “team of war.” How should the opposition respond, and what agenda should it offer society?
The authorities are attempting to construct a false dilemma—“security” versus “change of power”—in order to intimidate society and control public sentiment.
However, political experience shows that society is far more receptive to and supportive of concrete, realistic programs—economic growth, job creation, social justice, poverty reduction, and clear security guarantees—than to rhetoric of fear, hopelessness, and manipulation.
Accordingly, the opposition should respond not merely by rejecting these false narratives, but primarily by offering a clear, constructive, and realistic agenda. This agenda must include: clear strategies in the field of security, strengthening the state’s defense capacity, and real guarantees; economic reboot, job creation, and poverty reduction; overcoming social inequality and consolidating society; and in foreign policy—a balanced approach aligned with national interests, without one-sided dependence.
All of this can be articulated in a simple, calm, yet powerful ideology. Such an approach will not only neutralize the authorities’ fear-based propaganda but also build trust, mobilize apathetic voters, and create a real prospect of hope and change—based not on fear, but on concrete solutions and a vision for the future.
Who, in your view, are the main players in the upcoming elections, and what capacities do they have? What kind of parliament could be formed?
The main players today, in my view, are the Armenia Alliance, the Mother Armenia party—which has recently demonstrated noticeable growth and mobilization potential—as well as Mer Dzeyov and the Prosperous Armenia party.
In my personal opinion, if the opposition participates in at least two or three separate blocs and is subsequently able to form a coalition, Mer Dzeyov will confidently overcome the 5 percent threshold. The Armenia Alliance and the Mother Armenia party will also enter parliament, given current sociological trends and public sentiment.
Coordinated or unified actions by these forces can significantly reduce the chances of the reproduction of the Civil Contract party and lead to a change of power.
I am convinced that the 2026 elections will not be merely a vote, but a decisive moment for the future of the Armenian people. We will not allow the current authorities to reproduce themselves—regardless of administrative resources or falsifications.
Finally, I would like to note that, as a political figure, I have decided to run as a candidate for parliament in the 2026 elections. This decision was made at the request of my friends, acquaintances, and supporters. I am ready to take part in this struggle—for real change and for the future of Armenia.