TRIPP is not only one of the priority issues on our country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda but also, and I will not shy away from the term, one of the most important issues in regional and global politics, drawing the attention of the world’s major powers. The name itself is already evidence of this, as are the proceedings initiated in the Constitutional Court and the subsequent procedures planned in the National Assembly.
In this context, some of the discussions taking place in Armenia’s political, expert and media circles are causing profound concern among specialists, myself included. Guided by professional and civic responsibility, I consider it my duty to share my professional reflections and views with the public once again.
I will therefore raise several key questions that each of us should consider and seek answers to when discussing TRIPP. Some of them are highly visible and obvious. Unfortunately, however, politicians’ statements and actions sometimes present them in ways that are far removed from reality and occasionally through incorrect formulations. This applies to certain groups both within the government and the opposition.
My assessments will therefore be professional rather than political, since I am not affiliated with any political group.
The first question, which is also the title of my speech, concerns the “known” and “unknown” TRIPP. What is known about TRIPP, and what remains unknown?
Before receiving the name TRIPP, the issue of a road through Syunik with a distinct status circulated under other names, the latest of which was the so-called “Zangezur Corridor.”
We have already had numerous opportunities to discuss what the “Zangezur Corridor” is and where the term originated. As Paruyrjyan noted, we published a book that has been translated into several languages, recently including Persian, and made available to political and academic circles.
Our answer is clear: the “Zangezur Corridor” is the ultimate objective of a nearly century-old Turkish-Azerbaijani project, either poorly concealed or not concealed at all.
We are now told, however, that this is no longer the “Zangezur Corridor” but TRIPP, with its fashionable name, and that it is not a corridor but a road. Incidentally, certain opposition figures from a particular political force express similar views and promote the same mistaken claim, attempting to justify it through supposed tactical or far-reaching considerations.
Under these circumstances, I pose the following two questions.
First, is there any logistical difference or even a one-centimetre deviation between the project called the “Zangezur Corridor” and TRIPP? More specifically, will TRIPP not be implemented along precisely the same route envisaged for the “Zangezur Corridor” and, moreover, planned by the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance?
Our answer is clear. As far as I can see from the planned and ongoing construction work involving the road and other infrastructure, there is not even a one-centimetre difference.
The second question is whether there is any difference in status between the unobstructed route from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan envisaged under the “corridor” and the one envisaged under TRIPP, despite formulations resembling various international terms, including “back office,” sovereignty and others.
The responses given by Armenian government officials appear evasive: they emphasize and invoke territorial integrity, sovereignty and similar terms.
I believe this question also has a clear answer. I emphasize that this is a road with an extraordinary status that fully satisfies the interests and objectives of the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem.
Clear evidence of this can be found in the enthusiasm prevailing among the political elites of those countries and in occasional formulations that reveal the poorly concealed essence of the issue. It is the “Zangezur Corridor” regime they expected, merely given a different name in international discourse.
Another rhetorical question: if this project is so beneficial to Armenia, why are Turkish and Azerbaijani political and state officials, who have harboured and continue to harbour racist hatred towards Armenia for decades, so enthusiastic about it?
This is therefore a project implemented not for Armenia’s benefit but at Armenia’s expense. That is the formula.
So much is now being said about TRIPP that the original source and essence of the issue have been forgotten. This may also be a method of propaganda, but the purpose of scholarship is precisely to return everyone to the true conclusions and demonstrate the original state of the matter.
We must now establish that TRIPP originated from a Turkish nationalist logistics programme and, as a result of misguided diplomacy and a simplistic approach, found its way into the statement-document of 9 November 2020, becoming a political trap for Armenia.
The trap was therefore not Artsakh, from which Armenia was supposedly liberated, but the “Zangezur Corridor” — TRIPP — which now serves as a trap for Armenia’s present and future.
Another global issue is the involvement of Trump and the United States. In my view, the United States’ pragmatic geopolitical interests and, perhaps, President Trump’s personal ambitions have become intertwined here.
Let us begin with the geopolitical interest.
Brzezinski clearly established that political geography is an important, delicate and fundamental factor in the United States’ global standing. He specifically highlighted maritime and land routes and corridors of global importance, such as the Suez Canal.
In other words, the issue is control over strategically important land and maritime routes.
What, figuratively speaking, is our region’s Suez Canal? The answer is clear: the road passing through Syunik.
Against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s threats against Armenia and statements expressing readiness for military aggression, Trump’s lifeline — TRIPP — appears.
The calculation is perfectly clear: the United States does not allow Azerbaijan to launch direct military aggression against Armenia.
Having rapidly overtaken the region’s two other players, Russia and Iran, in the political contest — or, to use automotive terminology, having staged a decisive race against them — the well-known document was signed in Washington on 8 August 2025. All sides appeared satisfied and seemingly emerged as winners.
However, this is impossible even in theory because the actual interests of the participating states are fundamentally opposed and cannot produce an outcome satisfactory to every side.
What, then, is the result? What do the parties concede, and what do they gain? In other words, what is supposedly so “well known” about TRIPP?
First, Azerbaijan de facto receives a road to Nakhchivan with the status of the “Zangezur Corridor” or something close to it. Turkey also supports this.
In return, Azerbaijan “concedes” the term “Zangezur Corridor,” and only within international discourse. It continues to use the term domestically. Evidence of this can be found frequently, most recently in remarks made by Hikmet Hajiyev two days ago.
Azerbaijan also “generously” agrees not to attack Armenia’s sovereign territory or resort to military aggression, although it has already done so against other sovereign territories of Armenia — this time, however, under a high-level international agreement.
Armenia supposedly gains, or saves face, because the term “Zangezur Corridor” is not used in the document. At the same time, Armenia’s sovereignty and an entire group of synonymous concepts are placed at risk. As a bonus, Armenia receives promises of chip production and financial inflows. Some concrete steps are being taken.
Yet Armenia concedes some degree of complete control over its strategic territory — even if, optimistically speaking, only a small degree — while the reputation of the Armenian state suffers substantial damage.
The political course described as the “diplomacy of concessions” is then forgotten, while the public is told that the authorities conceded nothing and even made gains.
I assume this precisely reflects George Orwell’s formula that “war is peace.” Now concession is presented as an achievement.
One more rhetorical question.
If this is an ordinary connectivity project, why does it involve so many extraordinary processes? If it is an ordinary road, why does Trump bestow or assign his name to it? If it is ordinary, why is everything surrounding it so unusual?
As a result, Trump resolves the issue of his country’s participation in controlling the most important route in the South Caucasus — figuratively speaking, gaining access to the South Caucasian Suez Canal or Strait of Hormuz.
He can also add the image of a peacemaker to his political narrative. It has been said that he rapidly resolved the thirty-year Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but this was achieved at the cost of explicit and painful concessions by one of the parties — Armenia.
And, of course, he creates another place in the world bearing his name. There had already been Lake Trump; now there is the Trump Route, and so on.
Incidentally, Trump himself appears to reveal all this in one of his recent controversial statements. A few days ago, while discussing the establishment of American control over the Strait of Hormuz, Trump made what I consider a highly revealing remark. I quote: “I am renaming the Strait of Hormuz the Trump Strait.”
The parallels are, in my opinion, perfectly clear: the Trump Route, TRIPP, the Trump Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. This also indicates how comparable the geopolitical value of the Strait of Hormuz is to that of the road passing through Syunik.
Finally, I would like to address a historical parallel that I noticed after the Washington document was signed and the road named after Trump was announced.
In the not-so-distant past, the Armenian people’s memories and expectations regarding US presidents involved far greater scope and more concrete programmes.
Approximately a century ago, on 10 August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, promising Armenia thousands of square kilometres of liberated homeland. One of Trump’s predecessors, US President Woodrow Wilson, headed this effort and, through an arbitral award, drew an extensive map of Armenia that never became a reality.
Compared with TRIPP and Trump, Wilson promised the Armenians and Armenia far more. Yet once again, political interest and calculation prevailed.
Frankly, it is my deep conviction that this entire process is not being carried out for the sake of the Armenian people or Armenia, because sentimentality has no place in politics and geopolitics.
TRIPP is, on the one hand, the product of clear geopolitical interests and, on the other, a century-old Turkish-Azerbaijani dream pursued at Armenia’s expense.
Armenia receives declarative assurances from all this, but at the same time faces the potential risk that its territory could become a platform for the competing interests of different geopolitical poles.
Blind faith in any state or power centre will inevitably lead to failure. The authorities who argue that our state’s security must not be tied to the political interests of a single country are themselves doing precisely that.
This is yet another attempt to substitute wishful thinking for reality — in this case, to view TRIPP not as a Turkish-Azerbaijani corridor but as an Armenian-American megaproject, following a logic reminiscent of the expression “after me, the flood.”
Turkologist Ruben Melkonyan