The outcomes of the Armenia-Azerbaijan summit held on August 8 in Washington remain a central topic of political debate in Armenia. Some see the summit as a success and are quick to declare the establishment of lasting peace in the region. Others, however, argue that the summit was merely another stage of ongoing concessions by the Armenian side. Political analyst Sergey Melkonyan emphasizes that the summit highlighted significant differences in the results achieved by the two sides and established a new balance of influence in the South Caucasus.
Armenia vs. Azerbaijan: What Was Gained
According to Melkonyan, the main declared achievements of the summit were the initialing of a peace agreement and the prospect of opening the Turkish border. However, both outcomes appear uncertain: “Initialing the peace treaty allows for the postponement of potential conflict escalation but does not eliminate it entirely.” Moreover, because Baku has conditioned the signing of the agreement on constitutional changes in Armenia, the formal signing is effectively postponed indefinitely. The actual opening of the border will largely depend on the extent of Turkey’s involvement.
For Azerbaijan, the summit proved far more productive. The initialing of the peace agreement imposes no new obligations on Baku, but it opens opportunities to strengthen relations with the United States. At the same time, Azerbaijan retains the freedom to act within its established modus operandi and may demand further concessions in the future, including on issues related to enclaves.
Baku also reached an agreement with Yerevan to approach OSCE member states regarding the dissolution of the Minsk Group. This step, by itself, does not dissolve the group — the consent of other members is still required — but it signals a trend: Yerevan is once again prepared to depart from its initial position, having previously insisted that it would sign the document only after the peace agreement was finalized.
Another significant development for Baku was the repeal of Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, opening new avenues for military-technical cooperation with Washington.
Implications for External Actors
Melkonyan notes that a new situation is forming for Russia in the South Caucasus: a status quo is emerging without Moscow’s direct involvement and without full consideration of its interests. “It is too early to speak of Russia’s complete withdrawal from the region — options for participation in future arrangements remain. However, Russia is losing its monopoly on influence, necessitating the development of new models of engagement and competition with regional and extra-regional actors,” he explains.
Iran, according to Melkonyan, has also been sidelined in shaping the region’s new dynamics. “The potential presence of American companies near Armenia’s northern borders compels Tehran to engage more actively to mitigate risks and protect its interests. Turkey, on the other hand, gains a clear increase in influence, positioning Ankara as a potential key regional player. The realization of this advantage will depend heavily on the implementation of projects like TRIPP and whether the border opening with Armenia will be full or partial,” he adds.
Internal Implications for Armenia and Azerbaijan
Domestically, Melkonyan emphasizes that Armenia has made several consecutive concessions. “The conditions for the transport route to Nakhijevan have changed: previously, Yerevan was willing to provide access under terms similar to the Araz Corridor through Iran, but the current conditions are entirely different.”
Armenia must also reconsider the operational format of the EU monitoring mission, which, under the initialed agreement, is supposed to leave the border. “The mission will likely continue in another form. As a result, Armenia becomes the most internationalized country in the region, hosting European observers, Russian border guards, a Russian military base, and an American company,” Melkonyan notes.
For Baku, the summit secured conditions for transport communications with Nakhijevan, guaranteeing “unimpeded” access to its exclave, which provides immediate strategic benefits. The document on unimpeded access gives Azerbaijan legitimate grounds to open the route should regional or international circumstances change, Melkonyan stresses.
Given these factors, it is premature to speak of a new era of peace. Until Azerbaijan fulfills key conditions — including the return of Armenian prisoners, withdrawal from occupied Armenian territories, restoration of the rights of forcibly displaced residents of Karabakh, and abandonment of expansionist projects like “Western Azerbaijan” — it is impossible to claim serious peace intentions from Baku or the advent of sustainable stability, the expert concludes.