The assessment of Armenia’s recent history has always been subject to debate and divergent interpretations. Some consider the 2018 change of power as the beginning of a new phase of democratic development, while others see it as a period of lost opportunities and growing contradictions.
Political analyst Richard Kirakosyan offers his own perspective on how and why Armenia’s political directions have changed following the change of power. His evaluations are sometimes controversial and do not always align with mainstream perceptions, but that is precisely what makes them valuable: they allow a different angle from which to examine the processes of recent years.
From “Internal Revolution” to a New Agenda
According to Kirakosyan: “During the 2018 change of power, when Nikol Pashinyan came to power following the rare victory of a non-violent popular movement, one feature stood out—the high level of discipline. There was no violence at the demonstrations, and the movement deliberately avoided geopolitical slogans. Any external symbols, including flags, were intentionally left out, as the movement focused entirely on domestic issues. The goal was to show that this was not a ‘new Maidan,’ nor a confrontation between Russia and the West, but a popular demand driven solely by Armenia’s internal problems.
By the time he came to power, it was already clear that nationalism had lost influence in the political discourse. The emphasis was placed on fighting corruption, establishing democracy, and reforming the state, away from geopolitical or nationalist positions.
Pashinyan’s rise to power differed significantly from his predecessors. Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan had entered the political arena from Nagorno-Karabakh, being linked to that frozen conflict. Pashinyan carried no such burden; he did not view Karabakh as political capital, but rather as a burden hindering the country’s development.
Another notable feature was the personal understanding initially formed between Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. This raised expectations in Baku for a more constructive dialogue with democratic Armenia. However, these expectations collapsed in 2018–2019, particularly due to Pashinyan’s statement ‘Karabakh is Armenia,’ which was perceived in Azerbaijan as a betrayal. This, in turn, contributed to the logic that led to the 2020 war.”
The 2020 War: The Collapse of Illusions
Kirakosyan argues: “In autumn 2020, Azerbaijan launched an unprecedented prolonged offensive war that lasted 44 days. This war was unique for several reasons. First, Azerbaijan received open military support from Turkey, including drones, air forces, and joint operations. Second, the military objectives were clearly limited: to reclaim Azerbaijani territories outside of Karabakh, which had previously served as buffer zones.
Armenia’s unprepared defense prolonged the war; Azerbaijan had initially expected it to last only about a week, but it continued as successes followed one another. Russia, in turn, took a waiting position, refraining from intervention.
The greatest loss in this war was not only the territories or casualties; the real loss was the destruction of the Armenian people’s self-confidence and overestimated perception of strength. For years, Armenia considered itself the ‘Israel of the region,’ while reality proved far harsher.
A second major loss was the removal of the deterrence mechanism; Armenia no longer had the force or allies capable of halting Azerbaijan’s military threats. Moreover, the 2020 war created dangerous precedents: achieving results through the use of force, and the apparent success of authoritarian regimes over struggling democracies.
Nevertheless, surprises also emerged in Armenia. Despite the defeat, Pashinyan was re-elected in democratic elections. Most importantly, there was no widespread disappointment with democracy; the public did not lose faith in free elections or the political system.”
A New Strategy: Adaptation and Reassessment
According to Kirakosyan: “After the war, the Armenian government was forced to recognize that progress was impossible without compromise. This awareness was also linked to the fact that previously missed diplomatic opportunities could have been more advantageous than the outcome of the war.
Armenia also sought to localize the conflict by moving it into bilateral negotiations and reducing the influence of external mediators. This was important not only politically but also psychologically; negotiations needed to become Armenian-Azerbaijani, rather than a competition among great powers.
Azerbaijan’s maximalist position posed a serious challenge for Armenia; Baku, having achieved the first military victory, was reluctant to retreat from its demands. Armenia’s task was to differentiate real demands from populist statements directed at Aliyev’s domestic audience.
In December 2022, Azerbaijan implemented a new strategy by effectively blockading Karabakh, which culminated in September 2023 with the forced handover of Artsakh’s Armenian population. This deprived the Armenian opposition of its last support base.
Following this, Armenia’s new strategy rests on three main pillars:
- Diversification – seeking security partners beyond Russia and the West, in Asia and other regions.
- Security system reform – transitioning from the classical army model to smaller, professional forces, comparable to a national guard structure.
- Formulation of the ultimate goal – building a state based on Armenia’s current borders, geography, and interests. This includes normalization with Turkey, dialogue with Azerbaijan, restoration of economic connectivity, overcoming regional isolation, and turning Armenia into a regional transport and economic hub.
Armenia has abandoned the strategy of reclaiming what was lost; the government has adopted a more realistic approach: to build a state that lives not in the past, but in the present, while striving toward the future.”