Tensions around Iran continue to escalate. Tough statements from the United States and displays of military power are accompanied by promises of negotiations. What is Washington’s real objective, where is Tehran’s red line, and where is this dangerous game leading?
Limited High-Precision Military Actions Against Iran
According to Iran expert Tigran Davudyan, U.S. President Donald Trump does not seek a large-scale war. His primary goal is to present himself to the world as a peace-loving president.
“He has repeatedly stated that he has ended eight wars, that he wanted to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, which he was not awarded, and that he hopes to receive it in the future,” Davudyan notes.
However, this does not mean that Trump rules out the use of force. On the contrary, he favors limited, high-precision military operations. Davudyan cites the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities as well as the operation to abduct the president of Venezuela as examples of this approach.
The U.S. Plan and Iran’s “Red Line”
According to Davudyan, nearly all analysts today believe that the United States has a developed plan for targeted strikes should Iran refuse to accept three key points of the negotiating agenda.
At the same time, he emphasizes that for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the paramount and non-negotiable issue is the preservation of the regime.
“This has been stated many times by both the current leader and the founding leader. Iran’s red line is the survival of the regime,” Davudyan says.
In his assessment, this is precisely why Iran is prepared to make concessions. However, these concessions are accompanied — and will continue to be accompanied — by a strategy of buying time. According to the expert, Iran possesses diplomatic cunning and consistently seeks to delay processes.
Davudyan recalls that during the previous round, the Iranian side dragged out negotiations until the end of Trump’s presidential term. Under a Democratic president, relations partially normalized. Now that Trump is president again, Iran is once more employing the same tactic.
What Concessions Tehran May Make
According to Davudyan, Iran may concede on the issue of enriched uranium. Specifically, this concerns the transfer of approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent to a third country. The most likely scenario, he says, is the transfer of this material to Russia.
Commenting on Tehran’s statements that even a single shot by the United States would trigger a massive response, Davudyan is convinced that this too does not imply a large-scale war.
According to him, Iran will not dare to directly bomb U.S. military bases. He recalls a previous case when a U.S. base in Iraq was shelled only after the Iranian side had issued a prior warning through the Iraqi prime minister, allowing U.S. forces to evacuate personnel in advance.
Today, Davudyan says, a similar situation is unfolding around U.S. military bases in Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The United States is temporarily withdrawing troops from these countries while simultaneously deploying large numbers of missiles and defensive systems to those areas.
Turkey’s Interests Regarding Iran
According to Davudyan, Ankara does not want a power vacuum or regime collapse in Iran, as this would lead to a range of dangerous consequences, primarily for Turkey itself.
He emphasizes that Turkey’s main concerns regarding Iran are strategic in nature.
The first is the Kurdish issue. Any major upheaval inside or around Iran immediately affects the Kurdish factor. Turkey does not want a situation to emerge in Iran that could stimulate Kurdish movements or create new opportunities for agendas of Kurdish autonomy or independence.
The second, no less important factor is Israel. According to Davudyan, if the Islamic Republic of Iran collapses and pro-Western forces come to power, Israel could once again establish a presence in Iran, as it did 47 years ago during the era of the Shah. In that case, Israel’s presence in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood would become a serious strategic challenge for Ankara.
“Today we see that in the Arab world, especially on the Palestinian and Gaza issues, Israel and Turkey are effectively adversaries,” Davudyan notes. Under such conditions, Turkey does not want one of its main rivals to appear right on its borders — in Iran.
In Davudyan’s assessment, if Israel strengthens its position in Iran, Turkey itself could be at risk in the next stage. Changes in the regional balance of power could directly undermine Turkey’s position and, in the long term, create new levers of pressure on Ankara.
Turkey is also concerned about the potential influx of migrants. In the event of a major crisis or regime collapse in Iran, Turkey could face a new wave of migration, creating serious social, economic, and political challenges domestically.
Finally, the economic factor. Davudyan notes that Turkey’s recent economic activity and certain growth trends are partly due to Iran’s isolation and sanctions. Iran’s constrained capabilities have allowed Turkey to occupy certain economic niches and benefit from the situation.
Taking all these factors together, Davudyan concludes that Turkey supports the continued survival of Iran’s current system.
Baku Also Opposes Major Changes in Iran
According to Davudyan, Azerbaijan’s stance on Iran is also based not on ideology but on strictly pragmatic economic calculations.
At present, Azerbaijan plays an important role in Israel’s energy security. Around 60 percent of Israel’s oil demand is met by Azerbaijani oil, delivered to Israel via a pipeline running through Turkey.
This situation gives Baku strategic importance for both Israel and Western countries. However, this position is maintained only as long as Iran remains under isolation and sanctions.
If the United States and Western countries return to the Iranian market and Israel gains the opportunity to purchase Iranian oil directly, Azerbaijan’s role would sharply diminish. In that case, Israel would no longer need Azerbaijani oil, as Iranian oil would be both cheaper and more convenient logistically.
“In that case, Azerbaijan would lose its importance,” Davudyan emphasizes.
For this reason, Baku is not interested in radical changes in Iran or in the collapse of the regime. Iran’s return to the global energy market would mean competition under which Azerbaijan would lose its exclusive position.