The TRIPP initiative differs significantly from other regional communication routes and contains a number of serious risks for Armenia. This assessment was offered by political analyst Sergey Melkonian, whose analysis focuses on the project’s legal regime, political implications, and economic calculations.
The Risk of a Special Regime for Azerbaijani Citizens
According to Melkonian, one of the most problematic aspects of TRIPP is the regime envisioned for the transit of Azerbaijani citizens. Despite official statements about preserving Armenia’s sovereignty and introducing restrictions, it remains unclear how this regime would function in practice.
He notes that references to a division between a “front office” and a “back office” effectively imply a reduced Armenian role. In this framework, Armenia would have little to no presence in the front office, while documentation and interaction with travelers would be handled by other entities.
This creates unequal conditions: Azerbaijani citizens may receive a special transit regime through Armenia, while citizens of Georgia and Iran are not granted comparable arrangements.
TRIPP Opens, but Other Routes Remain Closed
Another key issue is the lack of guarantees that the launch of TRIPP will lead to the opening of other communication routes. Melkonian считает it more likely that Turkey will keep its border closed or open it only to third-country nationals, which does not constitute full normalization.
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has not opened the Nakhichevan direction for Armenia. Melkonian considers this far more important than the Turkish border. Around 30 percent of Armenia’s exports pass through Iran toward the Persian Gulf and Asian markets, which continue to grow and offer significant economic potential.
Transport Bypasses and Economic Calculations
Melkonian recalls that even today, Russian grain shipments to Armenia travel via the Baku–Tbilisi route, incurring unnecessary transit costs. If Azerbaijan were willing, these goods could be transferred directly at the border, reducing expenses. Such readiness, however, does not exist.
Against this backdrop, Armenia’s active involvement in the TRIPP process may result in a situation where TRIPP functions fully, while other borders and routes remain closed or only partially open.
The Turkey–Nakhichevan Project and Bypassing Armenia
Melkonian also highlights Turkey’s continued construction of the Kars–Nakhichevan route. Even if the Kars–Gyumri railway is reopened, this does not mean that Turkey will use Armenian territory for trade with Central Asia or Azerbaijan.
According to him, Turkey will move from Kars to Nakhichevan, then through Syunik to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, bypassing Armenia’s main railway hubs. As a result, expectations of “large transit revenues” for Armenia are unrealistic.
Absence of the Reciprocity Principle
One of the most serious issues, Melkonian argues, is the lack of reciprocity. While Azerbaijan gains special opportunities under TRIPP, Armenia does not receive equivalent access, such as in the Nakhichevan direction.
In this context, he questions claims that Armenia could use TRIPP as a political or diplomatic lever. If the project is managed by a joint Armenian–American company, it is difficult to see how Armenia could use it against US allies Turkey or Azerbaijan.
Moreover, there is a real risk that Turkey and Azerbaijan could close or restrict their borders while TRIPP remains open due to contractual obligations. In such a scenario, Armenia would effectively be left without leverage.
The Risk of a New Form of Isolation
Melkonian warns that even under conditions of declarative unblocking, Armenia may find itself in a new form of isolation — a state of semi-blockade. The prioritization of TRIPP could crowd out Armenia’s internal railway and transport routes, limiting the country’s economic and political options in the region.