Armenia’s integration process with the European Union could create serious challenges for the country’s energy security if political changes are not accompanied by the necessary infrastructure, technology and financing. According to energy security expert Vahe Davtyan, the central question for Armenia is not simply whether its foreign policy direction changes, but whether the country has the economic and energy capacity to bear the cost of that transition.
Davtyan argues that the term “diversification,” frequently used in political debate, cannot be reduced to replacing one supplier with another. Genuine diversification requires alternative supply routes, appropriate infrastructure, investment and a long-term strategy.
Azerbaijani Gas Is Not Yet a Real Alternative
The possibility of importing natural gas from Azerbaijan has recently been discussed as one potential alternative for Armenia. Davtyan, however, considers the scenario more of a political assumption than a ready economic project.
The Ijevan-Gazakh gas pipeline, which operated during the Soviet period, is currently inactive. Reopening it would require not only technical rehabilitation but also major investment, legal arrangements and political agreements.
Azerbaijan’s own gas capacity must also be taken into account. The country has been expanding exports to Europe, Turkey, Georgia and other markets, while gas production is projected to decline in the coming years.
According to figures cited by Davtyan, gas production was projected at around 38 billion cubic meters in 2026, 36.7 billion in 2027 and 34.5 billion cubic meters in 2028. Under these conditions, Azerbaijan’s export capacity is not unlimited.
TRIPP Does Not Solve Armenia’s Gas Supply Problem
Davtyan also questions whether TRIPP could provide Armenia with a meaningful alternative source of gas.
He says the project in its current form effectively lacks a substantial gas transportation component. Given Armenia’s annual consumption of around 2.3 billion cubic meters, infrastructure capable of covering domestic demand would require far greater throughput.
Based on international practice, Davtyan estimates that only around 10–15% of gas transported through a transit country may remain there for domestic use.
This would mean that Armenia would require a pipeline with a capacity of roughly 20 billion cubic meters annually to meet its current needs through such a model.
Given Azerbaijan’s own production limits, growing export commitments and regional infrastructure constraints, Davtyan considers such a scenario highly unrealistic.
Iran Remains the Most Logical Alternative in Theory
In Davtyan’s view, Iran remains Armenia’s most logical alternative supply direction in theoretical terms.
The Iran-Armenia pipeline has a designed capacity of around 2.3 billion cubic meters, yet Armenia currently imports only about 350–400 million cubic meters annually under the “gas-for-electricity” barter arrangement.
However, a major limitation remains: the Iran-Armenia pipeline is under Russian control and belongs to Gazprom.
Davtyan considers this a crucial factor often overlooked in public discussions about Armenia’s energy system. If Iran is presented as an alternative supplier, it must be recognized that this alternative currently depends on infrastructure owned by a Russian company.
The issue extends beyond the Iran-Armenia pipeline. Following agreements reached in 2013, Armenia’s entire gas transportation system is owned by Gazprom.
As a result, even partial diversification of gas supplies cannot entirely remove the Russian factor from Armenia’s energy system.
Gazprom Armenia continues to play a role not only in natural gas supplies but also in technical system management, investment policy and tariff regulation. The company plans to implement an investment program worth around AMD 150.3 billion, or roughly $400 million, through 2030.
Davtyan argues that this demonstrates the long-term infrastructure nature of Russia’s presence in Armenia’s energy sector. Any abrupt change would therefore require a restructuring of the entire energy architecture.
A Gas Price Increase Could Affect the Entire Economy
The issue is particularly sensitive because Russian gas is currently supplied to Armenia at a preferential price.
According to Davtyan, the price is $177.5 per thousand cubic meters.
Gas prices on European markets are considerably higher. Revising the current terms could therefore have an immediate effect on Armenia’s economy.
More than 40% of Armenia’s electricity is generated by gas-fired thermal power plants. Any substantial rise in gas prices could therefore increase electricity generation costs, raise expenses for households and businesses, intensify inflationary pressure and increase the government’s social spending.
Davtyan argues that gas supply is therefore not merely an energy issue but one directly connected to Armenia’s broader socioeconomic stability.
EU Support Cannot Replace Systemic Solutions
Davtyan also addresses statements that the European Union is prepared to support Armenia if energy-related difficulties arise.
In his assessment, financial and technical assistance may soften some of the consequences, but it cannot replace systemic solutions. Armenia would still require new infrastructure, long-term investment and a comprehensive energy strategy.
He specifically raises the possibility of importing liquefied natural gas. Such a scenario is theoretically possible, but Armenia would need the necessary logistics and regasification infrastructure.
According to Davtyan, building such capacity would require billions of dollars in investment.
European assistance and systemic energy independence are therefore not the same thing.
Renewables and the Future of Nuclear Power
Davtyan also cautions against basing diversification exclusively on renewable energy.
Solar and other renewable power plants have lower capacity factors, he notes, meaning they cannot fully replace thermal plants and nuclear power stations that provide stable generation.
This makes the future of Armenia’s nuclear sector particularly important.
Davtyan highlights the prospect of decommissioning the existing Armenian Nuclear Power Plant as a major issue. A roadmap for its closure is being discussed within the framework of cooperation with the EU, but the question of replacing it with stable and equivalent capacity remains unresolved.
He cites Lithuania’s Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, which was closed after the country joined the European Union, as an example. Without adequate replacement capacity, he warns, a similar step could increase Armenia’s dependence on electricity imports.
In this context, Davtyan also emphasizes the importance of regional electricity projects, including Armenia’s potential connection to the Black Sea electricity cable.
Yet the same limitation applies: without sufficient domestic generation capacity, Armenia’s ability to participate meaningfully in such systems will remain limited.
Diversification Must Not Become a Simple Change of Dependency
Davtyan’s main concern is that Armenia could simply replace one form of energy dependence with another.
Integration with European markets and regulatory systems may be described as diversification, but he argues that policymakers must also assess the new infrastructure and technological dependencies such integration could create.
“Energy systems do not change through political statements,” the expert emphasized.
In his assessment, ensuring Armenia’s energy security will require billions of dollars in investment, new infrastructure, technological solutions and long-term contracts.
The key question for Armenia is therefore not merely the direction of its foreign policy. It is whether the country has the economic, technological and infrastructure capacity to manage such a transition safely.
Davtyan concludes that European integration is not in itself a guarantee of energy security. It can produce that outcome only if it is accompanied by a carefully calculated and financially secured energy strategy.