During a briefing with journalists following the previous day’s government meeting, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan responded to a highly significant statement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 1 during a briefing with Russian journalists following the bilateral Pashinyan-Putin meeting.
The meeting, as everyone still clearly remembers, took place late on September 1 in Bishkek, following the conclusion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s work.
After the meeting, the Russian president briefed Russian journalists on his two days of work at the SCO summit, including bilateral meetings and, naturally, his meeting with Nikol Pashinyan.
In that context, answering one of the questions, Putin raised the issue of the Russian military base in Armenia and its possible withdrawal.
He said that if Yerevan believes it can do without the Russian military base and considers that it should be withdrawn, Russia is prepared to do so as early as tomorrow.
Putin’s statement is particularly significant because it came after his meeting with Pashinyan, even though there had not been so much as a hint about the Russian military base during the meeting itself.
The issue of security and the military component appeared to have no place, at least in the opening remarks. On the contrary, those remarks were dominated by the now-familiar European Union-EAEU debate.
Yet after the meeting, while answering questions from Russian journalists, Putin himself effectively raised the issue for the first time, saying that if Yerevan opposed the base’s continued presence, Russia was prepared to fulfill Yerevan’s demand or wish and withdraw it as early as tomorrow.
I noted the previous day on the “Topic of the Day” program that I consider this statement the most significant development concerning Armenian-Russian relations in the context of the Bishkek meeting.
The remaining issues, which are certainly also relevant and important, are expected to be discussed in Moscow in the near future.
Putin said he had invited Pashinyan for detailed and comprehensive discussions, including the participation of professional scientific delegations.
Therefore, the conversation in Bishkek may have had a much deeper geopolitical context.
This makes it particularly noteworthy that after meeting Pashinyan, Putin suddenly told Russian journalists that Moscow was even prepared to withdraw the military base.
Yerevan had never expressed such an intention, either during the preceding bilateral meeting or previously. On the contrary, it had repeatedly stated that withdrawal of the base was not on its agenda.
In this context, it is extremely noteworthy that Putin himself was effectively the first to say that Russia was prepared to withdraw the base if Yerevan opposed its continued presence.
Today Nikol Pashinyan responded by saying that any decision by Russia would be acceptable to Yerevan: if Moscow wants the base to remain, let it remain; if it does not, let it leave.
Yerevan considers the presence of the military base not to be vital.
It is difficult to disagree with Pashinyan on this point. The existence of the military base is not vital for Armenia, and this has nothing to do with Russia itself or Russia’s reliability as an ally.
In general, another state’s military presence in the form of a base cannot and should not be vital to any country.
Every military base has one purpose: to serve the interests of the state to which it belongs.
Armenia, or any other country hosting a foreign military base, cannot guarantee that the state operating that base will always be prepared to provide security to the extent expected by the host country.
Therefore, a military base can be an important element, component or structure within a security architecture, but it cannot and should not be vital.
From this perspective, it is difficult to disagree with the Armenian prime minister’s assessment.
This is almost an axiomatic truth because we are dealing with an institution or mechanism serving another state’s interests. Absolute alignment between those interests and the interests of the host state can never be guaranteed.
Now let us turn to the logic of Nikol Pashinyan’s response.
There is, to put it mildly, something strange about it.
The Armenian prime minister says that if Moscow wants to remove the base, it can do so; if it does not, it can remain.
It is as if the military base were an object sitting in a display case or on a visible shelf, and the owner of the house were saying: it does not bother me; if they want it to remain, let it remain, and if not, let it go.
The Russian military base is not an object. It is a geopolitical factor.
Its presence is determined by geopolitics, its presence shapes geopolitics, and whether it remains or leaves is a global issue.
It is an issue not only on a regional scale but perhaps at least within the broader context of the Greater Middle East.
From this perspective, the base is located on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, a state and subject of international law.
Prime Minister Pashinyan, who speaks about sovereignty at every appropriate and inappropriate opportunity, suddenly refrains from expressing a sovereign position on the Russian military base.
He could, for example, say that Armenia believes the base should remain and that Yerevan will work with Russia to ensure that it does.
Or he could say that Putin’s remarks prompted Armenia to consider whether the base should indeed be withdrawn.
But Nikol Pashinyan does not express a position on the Russian — or, for that matter, any foreign — military base located on Armenia’s sovereign territory.
Armenia’s highest-ranking political official does not express a position and effectively refuses to take one, saying that Yerevan is prepared to accept whatever decision the Russian Federation makes regarding the base.
If Russia wants it to remain, let it remain. If it does not, let it leave. Armenia will accept either outcome.
This is quite strange because, again, we are not talking about an object in a display case but about the military base of a nuclear power located on the sovereign territory of a state that is a subject of international law.
It has been and will remain a geopolitical factor, whether it stays or even if it leaves.
And it is here, within this geopolitical context, that Yerevan relinquishes its so-called sovereign right and effectively gives Russia the right to make a geopolitical decision on Armenian territory.
Yerevan says that whatever Moscow decides, it will accept and discuss.
This is a very interesting circumstance, although from a purely formal perspective it naturally sounds strange.
After all, we are talking about a geopolitical factor located on Armenian territory, and Armenia should have a position on it.
But Armenia has long lacked a geopolitical position.
Perhaps Armenia has a clearly formulated position on only one issue: that it should not contradict or oppose Azerbaijan on any matter.
On other issues, Yerevan appears to have no position and repeatedly demonstrates that it is prepared simply to surrender itself to the winds, moving in whichever direction the stronger and more persistent wind blows.
An example is Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that he would be pleased if the CSTO member states decided to remove Yerevan from the organization.
In other words, Armenia has no position on whether it should leave or remain. It says it would be very pleased if others relieved it of that dilemma and made the decision to remove it themselves.
Now, in the case of the Russian military base as well, official Yerevan, through Nikol Pashinyan’s response, effectively gives Russia the right to make a geopolitical decision in Armenia, on Armenia’s sovereign territory.
In the de facto realm of realpolitik, this can also be considered understandable because the Russian military base has been dictated or conditioned by Russia’s geopolitical interests.
Now that Russia itself is the first to raise the possibility of the base no longer being present or its readiness to withdraw it, this reflects a change or transformation in Russia’s geopolitical interests or in Moscow’s perceptions and approaches regarding the international security system.
Nikol Pashinyan probably senses all of this — if not, perhaps, knows certain details as a result of his meetings with the Russian president.
Broadly speaking, Pashinyan does not want to get caught between Russia and someone else.
He appears to believe that Putin raised the possibility of withdrawing the base not in the context of relations with Yerevan, but rather used relations with Yerevan as the occasion while addressing Russia’s agreements or confrontations with other geopolitical centers of power.
In other words, Putin’s remarks about the base were intended for ears other than those of Nikol Pashinyan and Armenian society.
Accordingly, Nikol Pashinyan is now effectively saying that those for whom Putin made the statement should themselves determine their position regarding the approach or readiness expressed by the Russian president.
It is by no means accidental or merely a chronological coincidence that Putin raised this issue, approach or readiness for the first time at the conclusion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
The SCO summit essentially reflected the transformational phase through which the entire Eurasian system is passing.
First and foremost, the security system of the Eurasian space and the broader Eurasian region is also undergoing transformation.
From this perspective, the perception of the Caucasus within Russian policy is changing as well. Russia’s approaches toward the Caucasus are changing.
One key manifestation of this is the major comprehensive strategic treaty Russia signed with Iran on January 17, 2025.
The treaty was ratified that same year and effectively entered into force.
Russia is essentially incorporating the Caucasus into the broader context of restructuring its global relationship with Iran.
In other words, the Caucasus is now a region that falls under the umbrella of the major Russian-Iranian agreement.
Of course, how the Russian-Iranian treaty and the broader relationship will develop remains an open question.
This depends not only on developments in Russia’s immediate neighborhood, including the war in Ukraine, but also on the highly tense and complicated situation surrounding Iran, including developments in the Middle East and the Gulf region.
Broadly speaking, however, Russia appears to have shifted its center of gravity toward Iran and intends to build its security policy in neighboring regions around that relationship.
On this basis, Moscow also appears to envision the future security architecture of the Caucasus.
This may be one of the reasons Russia is signaling that the significance of its military base in Armenia for Russian geopolitics has declined considerably.
It may have declined to the point where Moscow is prepared to turn the issue into an international subject — if not of bargaining, then at least of discussions and agreements.
Nikol Pashinyan is effectively signaling in Yerevan today that he does not intend to interfere in this matter and will accept whatever agreement Russia reaches on it.
The question, therefore, is with whom and how Russia will reach an agreement and, consequently, how it will exercise the geopolitical right that Nikol Pashinyan de facto grants it through today’s statement.
Political commentator Hakob Badalyan